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OUR BROKEN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND HOW TO
FIX IT: AN ESSAY ON HEALTH LAW AND POLICY
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost*
I. INTRODUCTION
The health care system of the United States is in serious
trouble. Nearly forty-six million Americans (15.7% of the
population) lacked, health insurance in 2004, the last year for which
data are available, and probably more are uninsured today.1 A
recent study by the prestigious Institute of Medicine estimated that
18,000 Americans die every year because they are uninsured and
thereby lack access to health care.2 Despite the fact that many
Americans lack access to health care, we spent over $1.9 trillion on
health care in 2004 3-more than we spent on food, housing,
transportation, or anything else-and the amount that we spend on
health care is increasing every year at rates far in excess of inflation
generally.4 Though most Americans are aware of these problems,
many still believe, as our President has often said, that "we've got
the best health care system in the world."5 In other words, they
* Robert L. Willett Family Professor of Law, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, Virginia Commonwealth University, Department of
Health Administration. I wish to thank Professors Sara Rosenbaum and David
Super for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay, Jacob Jost for
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1. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 16
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-
2 2 9 .pdf.
2. INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too LATE 162
(2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309083435/html.
3. Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004. Recent
Slowdown Led by Prescription Drug Spending, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, at
186, 186.
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2004-2005, at 431 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/
04statab/income.pdf. In 2002 American consumers spent $1.437 trillion on
medical care, $1.145 trillion on housing, $1.095 trillion on food and tobacco, and
$877 billion on transportation. Id.
5. U.S. Dep't of State, President Bush Discusses Quality, Affordable
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believe that we still receive high quality health care. In fact,
however, a series of studies over the past decade have shown that
the quality of health care in the United States is seriously deficient,
and, in particular, that medical errors are common and often have
serious consequences.6  Indeed, the quality of the health care
Americans receive is no better, and in some respects worse, than
that provided in many other countries that spend far less on health
care and yet provide it for all of their citizens.7
As disturbing as these facts are, however, we should be even
more troubled by the fact that the solutions most commonly being
considered for our access, cost, and quality dilemmas are unlikely to
solve these problems and may in fact exacerbate them. The health
policy nostrums currently being pressed by Congress-health
savings accounts, tax credits for the uninsured, and tort "reform"-
are deeply flawed. Though they may promote other agendas, such
as cutting taxes or protecting powerful interest groups, they serve
primarily to distract us from pursuing measures that could in fact
make a difference.
Fortunately, the bankruptcy of these proposals for reforming
our health care system does not leave us bereft of hope. In fact, we
have available in the world around us a wealth of experience with
approaches to organizing health care systems that have improved
access, resulted in lower costs, and promoted quality elsewhere and
could, with appropriate adjustments, work here. What we need,
indeed desperately need, is true evidence-based health care
reform-not legislation grounded in untested, ideologically based
theories.
Law has a role in this reform. Our current health care system
is built on a framework of laws-laws that create and define
entitlements in federal and state public insurance programs, laws
that regulate private health insurance, laws that create tax
incentives for employers to offer health insurance and for hospitals
to provide uncompensated care, laws that protect competition, and
laws that attempt to ensure the provision of quality care and to
Health Care (Jan. 28, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/s012804.htm.
6. See INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
1 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309068371/html [hereinafter
IOM, To ERR IS HUMAN]; INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW
HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1-2 (2001), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309072808/html [hereinafter IOM, QUALITY CHASM].
7. See Cathy Schoen et al., Primary Care and Health System Performance:
Adults' Experience in Five Countries, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Oct. 28,
2004, at W4-487, W4-500, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/
hlthaff.w4.487/DC1; see also Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does the Quality of
Care Compare in Five Countries?, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2004, at 89, 91-92.
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deter error. This edifice of law has grown by accretion oný an ad hoc
basis over the decades. The substratum of tort and contract law on
which it was built has long since been largely buried, though
medical negligence law still is relied upon to address medical error,
and contract law plays a marginal role in insurance disputes.8
What has superseded the common law is a very complicated,
sometimes contradictory, web of regulatory law. 9 There is no
discernable single theory grounding this body of law.'° Rather, a
series of statutes and regulations have been adopted over the years,
each pursuing a particular policy or set of policies. The National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 197411 and the
state certificate of need programs based on it, for example, were
grounded in the theory that supply constraints could be relied on to
control cost,'2 while the application of the antitrust laws to the
health care industry has been directed toward removing artificial
restraints on competition.13 Some of the statutes enacted to regulate
health care, arguably, pursue no defensible policy at all but can only
be understood in terms of interest-group politics. Many state
insurance-law providers or benefit-coverage mandates, for example,
are best explained as the successful efforts of various provider
groups to gain access to health insurance dollars. 4
For real reform to happen, we will need to create a unified and
coordinated framework of health care law based on a coherent and
evidence-based understanding of the fundamental problems that
plague our health care system and an understanding of how a
health care system should be constructed so as to overcome these
problems. This Essay describes what such a framework could look
like, the policies on which it would be based, and the strategies that
could be pursued to put it into place.
This Essay first describes in some detail the problems that the
American health care system faces-problems of access, cost, and
quality-and why these problems exist. Only by thoroughly
8. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 264-78, § 9-2, at 466-
71 (2d ed. 2000).
9. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A
Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2004).
10. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 247 (2003) (proposing several principles grounding health law).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-
660, 100 Stat. 3743 (1986).
12. FURROW ETAL., supra note 8, § 1-19, at 30-31.
13. Id. § 14-1, at 671-72.
14. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 28 (2004) [hereinafter, DOSE OF COMPETITION],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694.htm.
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understanding these problems and their causes can we begin to
understand how to solve them. This Essay next describes the
current hodgepodge of laws that govern the health care system. It
then sets out the fundamental principles on which a reformed health
care system must be built, that is, what we must do to assure access,
cost control, and quality. Next, this Essay turns to describing what
the legal framework of a reformed health care system would look
like. Finally, it sketches a political strategy that could be pursued to
put such a framework into place.
II. THE PROBLEMS
A. Access: The Forty-Six Million Uninsured
In 2004, according to Census Bureau estimates, nearly forty-six
million Americans lacked health insurance at some point in time.'6
To get an accurate perspective on the problem of health insurance in
the United States, however, one needs a movie, not a snapshot. If
one examines the phenomena of uninsurance over time, one sees
many more uninsured-almost eighty-two million, or one-third of all
non-elderly Americans-were uninsured at some point during 2002
and 2003.16 One also sees a very dynamic picture-people moving
from private to public insurance, from public to private insurance, or
among private insurers; people who lack insurance for long periods
of time, perhaps the entire period; and people who are uninsured for
a single short period, or for repeated short periods of time.'7
Most uninsured Americans-about eighty percent-are either
employed or in households of persons that are employed.18 This is
because many Americans who are unemployable-the elderly, the
disabled, and children-are covered by public insurance programs."Most of the uninsured who are employed, however, are part-time or
15. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
16. See FAMILIES USA, ONE IN THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERicANs WITHOUT
HEALTH INSURANCE, 2002-2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/82million-uninsured_report6fdc.pdf. For a
more thorough analysis of the four-year period from 1996 to 1999, see Pamela
Farley Short & Deborah R. Graefe, Battery-Powered Health Insurance?
Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 244,
247.
17. Short & Graefe, supra note 16, at 247-49.
18. Sherry A. Glied, Challenges and Options for Increasing the Number of
Americans with Health Insurance, 38 INQUIRY 90, 91 (2001).
19. See In Critical Condition: America's Ailing Health Care System: Before
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 5 (2003) (statement of Karen Davis,
President, The Commonwealth Fund), available at http://www.cmwf.org/
usr_doe/davis_senatecommitteetestimony-622.pdf.
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seasonal employees, work at low-wage jobs, are self-employed, or
work for very small businesses and are not offered health insurance
benefits by their employers.2 ° Most uninsured persons also have
very low incomes-one quarter are from households with incomes
below the poverty level, fifty-four percent from households with
incomes below two-hundred percent of the poverty level.2 ' With
health insurance costing hundreds of dollars a month, persons
working at minimum wage jobs simply cannot afford it. The
uninsured also tend disproportionately to be minorities-especially
Hispanics-and to be young.2 2
The picture is complicated, however. Many of the uninsured are
in fact reasonably well-off-8.4% are from households that earn
$75,000 or more per year.22 Many of these more wealthy uninsured
persons are temporarily between jobs and judge their short-term
risk of facing catastrophic health care costs to be low. 24 Some of the
uninsured are individuals who work for large employers that in fact
offer health benefits, but these individuals decline the offer rather
than pay the employee's share of premiums (which averaged $222
per month for family coverage in 2004).26 Some are young people
who cannot imagine themselves needing expensive health care.
Some no doubt overestimate the extent of the nation's health care
safety net.2' A few, probably a very few, decide rationally to self-
insure rather than bear the cost of insurance for the long term.27
20. INST. OF MED., COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE 60-62,
67-70 (2001)..
21. Cover the Uninsured Week, Fact Sheet: Income and Poverty Status,
http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/factsheets/display.php?FactSheetID=108 (last
visited Feb. 11, 2006).
22. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 tbl.7 (stating that 32.7%
of Hispanics are uninsured, as are 31.4% of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-
four).
23. Id.
24. Families with incomes above four hundred percent of the poverty level
who are uninsured at some point over a four-year period are most likely to have
a single gap of coverage and are rarely uninsured for the entire period. Short &
Graefe, supra note 16, at 250.
25. Jon Gabel et al., Health Benefits in 2004: Four Years of Double-Digit
Premium Increases Take Their Toll on Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2004,
at 200, 202.
26. Polling data show that a majority of Americans believe that the
uninsured are already able to get the medical care that they need. See Kaiser
Family Found., Knowledge: Uninsured People's Access to Health Services,
http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/archive_April2004/5.cfm (last visited Feb.
11, 2006).
27. See BOWEN GARRETT, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: SPONSORSHIP, ELIGIBILITY
AND PARTICIPATION PATTERNS IN 2001, at 21-22 (2004) (noting that only 4.6% of
20061 541
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Finally, many are persons who are eligible for public insurance,
such as Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program
("SCHIP"), but for whatever reason-lack of outreach, bureaucratic
barriers, stigmatization, fear of identifying themselves to the
government, or simple inertia-have not signed up.2 8
At bottom, however, there are two fundamental reasons why a
private insurance-based system will always have many persons who
are not insured, and any plan to reduce or eliminate uninsurance
from the United States has to address both. The first is the highly
skewed nature of health care costs. In any given year, a very small
proportion of the population is responsible for most health care
costs, while the vast majority of the population experiences few, if
any, health care expenses. The most expensive one percent of the
population is responsible for over a quarter of health care costs; the
most expensive five percent is responsible for over half.29
Conversely, the least expensive half of the population accounts for
less than three percent of health care expenditures.2 °
At all ages, persons with chronic mental and physical
disabilities are responsible for most health care spending.2 1 Indeed,
treatment of chronic conditions, such as mental disorders,
pulmonary conditions, hypertension, asthma, or diabetes, have
accounted for a high percentage of the increase in health care
spending in recent years.8 2 But many of these conditions, as well as
acute conditions like some forms of cancer or trauma, initially strike
capriciously and with little or no warning.
The answer to capricious risk is insurance. Because health care
costs are so concentrated, health insurance, either public or private,
is ubiquitous in countries wealthy enough to afford expensive, high-
technology, health care.2 3 Health insurance spreads the risk from
employees who were eligible for employment-covered insurance but declined it
thought they did not need insurance, compared to 52.2% who said that it was
too expensive).
28. Cindy Mann & Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J.L. MED.
& ETHics 416, 419 (2004).
29. Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health
Expenditures, Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 9, 12.
30. Id. at 13.
31. See Benjamin G. Druss et al., The Most Expensive Medical Conditions
in America, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 105, 106-07; Kenneth E. Thorpe,
Curtis S. Florence & Peter Joski, Which Medical Conditions Account for the
Rise in Health Care Spending?, HEALTH AFF.-WEB ExcLusivE, Aug. 25, 2004, at
W4-437, W4-440 to -441, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w4.437vl.pdf.
32. See Thorpe, Florence & Joski, supra note 31, at W4-440 to -441.
33. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the
Uninsured: Lessons from International Experience with Private Insurance, 76
[Vol. 41542
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those who require high cost health care to those who do not. It thus
makes health care more affordable .for all. The distribution of the
risk of health care costs is not wholly capricious, however.
Individuals can to a certain extent predict the likelihood that they
will experience high health care costs during a given year, and
insurers can make such predictions as well. If health insurance is
sold in voluntary market transactions-in which any individual can
decide whether or not to purchase insurance, and any insurer can
decide whether to offer insurance to any individual-the risk-
selection game ensues.8 4 People who expect themselves to remain
healthy decline insurance, while those who expect themselves to be
unhealthy purchase it (the latter phenomenon is known as adverse
selection).35 Insurers, on the other hand, seek out people who are
likely to remain healthy or offer insurance to those who present
36higher risks only if they pay higher premiums.Alternatively, insurers can try to insure preexisting pools of
insureds large enough 'to spread risk broadly and formed in such a
way as to make adverse selection less likely. Large groups of
employees are one such group, and it is not surprising that not only
our health insurance system, but also the social insurance systems
of central Europe, are based, at least historically, on employment-
based groups . The biggest pool of insureds, however, and the one
N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 452 (2001) (describing the mix of public and private
insurance found in other countries).
34. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING
OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 13-14
(2003).
35. See MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 11 (1994);
Lea Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One
Invisible Hand Clapping, 47'OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 844 (1986).
36. See generally Michael Rothschild 1 & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976).
37. See Jost, supra note 33, at 451. There are, of course, other reasons why
employment-based insurance makes sense. Employees like it. Sixty percent of
employees in a recent poll rated health insurance as their most important
fringe benefit. RACHEL CHRISTENSEN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST.,
VALUE OF BENEFITS CONSTANT IN A CHANGING WORLD: FINDINGS FROM THE 2001
EBRI/MGA VALUE OF BENEFITS SURVEY 1 (2002). But, at the same time,
employment-related health insurance is also of value to employers, since
healthy employees are more productive and less likely to be absent from work.
See Ellen O'Brien, Employers' Benefits from Workers' Health Insurance, 81
MILBANK Q. 5, 6 (2003). Employment-related health insurance reduces the cost
of insurance by reducing the marketing and underwriting costs that attend
individual insurance, decreases the risk to the insurer that the insured will
default on premium payments, and gives the employees the benefits of the
employer's bargaining power and insurance expertise. Finally, because
2006] 543
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least vulnerable to adverse selection, is the entire population of a
country. Thus, public insurance, provided either through social
insurance or through national health insurance systems, has
become the norm throughout the developed world.38
The second reason why private insurance is not adequate to
cover the population of an entire country is the problem of
affordability. For reasons explored below, health care is
extraordinarily expensive. 39  Because health care is expensive,
health insurance is expensive as well., The average employment-
related family health insurance policy-the form of insurance most
American families have-cost $9,950 in 2004.40 A person who works
forty hours a week, fifty-two weeks a year, at the minimum wage of
$5.15 per hour, would have to spend ninety-three percent of pre-tax
income to cover the cost of such a policy if she had to buy the policy
from her own funds without employer assistance.4 ' A household
would have to earn over $66,000 per year, 350% of the federal
poverty level, before the cost of health insurance would fall to a
more or less affordable fifteen percent of pre-tax income.42 The
barriers of risk and affordability, moreover, interact perniciously.
People in bad health often find it hard to hold down jobs, while
lower income people are disproportionately in worse health.43 It is
employment-related health insurance is tax subsidized, it is more affordable to
workers. See JOST, supra note 34, at 187-90; David A. Hyman & Mark Hall,
Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETHICS 23, 30-35 (2001).
38. Jost, supra note 33, at 434.
39. Gabel et al., supra note 25, at 200-02.
40. Id. at 202.
41. Some surveys show that premiums for individual insurance policies are
much lower. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UPDATE ON INDIVIDUAL HEALTH
INSURANCE 5 (2004), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Update-on-Individual-
Health-Insurance.pdf. The benefits of these individual policies, however, seem
to be much poorer than those of employment-related insurance. Forty percent
of individual insurance policies covered by the survey, for example, had
deductibles in excess of $2,000 in 2003. Id. at 6. By contrast, the average
deductible for PPO in network employer-based coverage in 2003 was $275.
Gabel et al., supra note 25, at 204. Recent research into the medical causes of
bankruptcy finds that insurance policies with high deductibles and co-payments
leave insureds exposed to financial ruin. David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness
and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Feb. 2,
2005, at W5-63, W5-70, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgiIcontent/full/hlthaff.
w5.63/DC1.
42. The 2004 federal poverty level for a family of four is $18,850. Annual
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 7,335, 7,336 (Feb. 13,
2004).
43. See Nancy E. Adler & Katherine Newman, Socioeconomic Disparities in
Health: Pathways and Policies, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 60, 60; Angus
544 [Vol. 41
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not surprising that most uninsured Americans are poor and many
poor are uninsured.44
Most countries address the problem of affordability, as they do
the problem of skewed costs, by providing public heath insurance,
financed either through general taxes or through social health
insurance programs that are funded through premiums based on a
percentage of wages.45 In the United States, we have addressed the
affordability problem less effectively by covering some of the poorest
or highest-cost populations (the elderly, disabled, and poor families)
through public insurance and by tax subsidizing employment-based
insurance for the rest of our population, thereby transferring some
of the cost of the private insurance to the taxpayers.4 ' The remaining
cost of private insurance is largely borne by workers to whom the
cost is passed on by their employers as part of their total
compensation package. As health insurance has become more and
more expensive, however, employers have found it increasingly
difficult to pass on the cost of health insurance to workers through
holding down wage growth, as they have largely done in the past.47
Employers have instead had to pass it on directly through
increasing employee cost-sharing but this in turn has encouraged
lower-wage workers to decline coverage, causing more low wage or
high-risk people to become uninsured.4"
All of this would not matter so much if health insurance were
not so necessary conditional for getting health care in the United
States. For reasons explained below, it is possible to gain access to
emergency care in the United States without health insurance.49 It
is much more difficult to gain access to preventive or primary care or
to care for chronic conditions. For these reasons, the uninsured get
less health care than the insured, and they get it later when it is
often less effective.5° Accordingly, the uninsured suffer higher
Deaton, Policy Implications of the Gradient of Health and Wealth, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2002, at 13, 13; Michael Marmot, The Influence of Income on Health:
Views of an Epidemiologist, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 31, 31.
44. See Adler & Newman, supra note 43, at 68.
45. See Jost, supra note 33, at 435-36.
46. Id. at 433.
47. See Gabel et al., supra note 25, at 208.
48. Average monthly employee premium contributions for family coverage
grew from $124 in 1993 to $201 in 2003. Id. at 204. On average, 85% of
employees "take up" insurance offered by their employers, but the rate varies by
income, with persons earning less than 100% of the poverty level accepting
employer-sponsored insurance only 71% of the time. GARRETT, supra note 27, at
14-15.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 174-75.
50. See Dianne Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, The Consequences of
Uninsurance for -Individuals, Families, Communities, and the Nation, 32 J.L.
545
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morbidity and mortality rates, and, as noted above, an estimated
18,000 adults die prematurely every year from lack of insurance.5'
Not only do individuals suffer, however, families and communities
suffer as well. Medical costs contribute to half of all bankruptcies,52
while hospitals in communities with high numbers of the uninsured
offer fewer services to vulnerable populations and have worse
financial margins." Indeed, the entire country loses because of the
lost productivity of those whose diseases and disabilities are not
addressed because of a lack of health insurance."4
Finally, difficulties in gaining access to health care are not just
the lot of the uninsured. There are serious gaps in both public and
private health insurance programs in the United States, and these
gaps limit access to health care. Neither Medicare nor private
employment-related health insurance provides much coverage for
long-term care. Private health insurance plans are increasingly
transferring the cost of health care to their insureds through high
cost-sharing obligations, which are likely to discourage the provision
of some necessary health care.55 Surveys show that even fully
insured persons often experience serious financial difficulties
because of health care expenses.'6 Delaying health care because of
its costs, however, can result in higher costs down the road when
conditions become more grave and must be treated.
B. Cost: The $1.9 Trillion Health Care Bill
In 2004, the last year for which cost data is more or less
complete, we spent nearly $1.9 trillion on health care. This
amounts to $6,280 per person, 16% of our gross domestic product
("GDP")."6 We spend far more on health care than any other country
does. In 2001, when the United States spent 13.9% of its GDP and
MED. & ETHICS 397, 399 (2004).
51. Id. at 399-400.
52. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 41, at W5-66.
53. Wolman & Miller, supra note 50, at 401-02.
54. The Institute of Medicine study estimated the cost to the United States
due to "the loss of health and longevity by the uninsured" at between $65 and
$130 billion a year. Id. at 402.
55. Gabel et al., supra note 25, at 204.
56. See Health Care Costs and Instability of Insurance: Impact on Patients'
Experiences with Care and Medical Bills: Hearing on a Review of Hospital
Billing and Collection Practices Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Sara R. Collins, The Commonwealth Fund), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id= 230634.
57. Smith et al., supra note 3, at 188 exh.2.
58. Id.
546 [Vol. 41
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4,887 purchasing-power parity international dollars ("$PPP"),59 on
health care, the United Kingdom spent 7.6% of its GDP, $PPP 1,992
per person; Germany spent 10.7% of its GDP on health care, $PPP
2,808 per person; while Canada spent 9.7% of its GDP on health
care, $PPP 2,792 per person.6° Moreover, the cost of health care is
steadily increasing. From 2002 to 2004 the cost of health care
increased at an average rate of over 8% per year, causing the
percentage of the GDP attributable to health care to grow from
13.8% in 2000 to 16% in 2004.61 Under current projections, by 2013
the cost of health care will grow to $3.36 trillion, 18.4% of GDP.62
What causes our high and steadily increasing health care costs?
One way of answering this question is to try to identify factors that
contribute to high and rising costs. One candidate here is certainly
technology.63 New drugs, devices, and procedures are constantly
coming on line, and they often cost significantly more than the
technologies that they replace.64 New technologies permit the
treatment of conditions that were, previously untreatable. New
diagnostic technologies identify otherwise undetected medical
conditions, which then must be treated. New "halfway" technologies
permit continued functioning in the face of conditions that cannot be
cured and previously could only be endured.65 But it all costs money.
59. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") defines PPP as follows: "Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) are
currency conversion rates that both convert to a common currency and equalise
the purchasing power of different currencies. In other words, they eliminate the
differences in price levels between countries in the process of conversion."
OECD, Definition of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), http://www.oecd.org/
department/0,2688,en_2649_34357- 1-1__1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2006).
60. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerard F. Anderson, U.S. Health
Care Spending in an International Context, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2004, at 10,
11.
61. Smith et al., supra note 3, at 187-88.
62. Stephen Heffier et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2013,
HEALTH AFF.-WEB ExcLusivE, Feb. 11, 2004, at W4-79, W4-80, http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprintlhlthaff.w4.79vl.
63. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Methodological Introduction to HEALTH
CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 1-3
(Timothy Stoltzfus Jost ed., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
STUDY].
64. See Benton A. Weisbord, The Nature of Technological Change:
Incentives Matter!, in ADOPTING NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 8, 19 (Annetine.C.
Gelijns & Holly V. Dawkins eds., 1994). See generally PENNY E. MOHR ET AL.,
HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AM. & BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ON FUTURE HEALTH CARE COSTS (2001), available at
http://www.ahipresearch.org/PDFs/26_FinalRptAppl&3.pdf.
65. See Eugene C. Grochowski, Ethical Issues in Managed Care: Can the
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In other industries, technological innovation often results in
reduced prices. As the speed and power of computers has increased
exponentially in recent years, their price has dropped
precipitously.66 In health care, however, technological improvement
often results in increased rather than reduced prices; and even when
prices are reduced, utilization rates often increase, resulting in
higher total costs. Laparoscopic cholecystectomy, for example, not
only costs less than traditional invasive cholecsystectomy, but is also
more convenient and less risky. This, however, has led to more
frequent use, resulting in higher total costs.
67
Other factors also contribute to increased costs. The population
is steadily aging, and older people require more health care (though
most European countries have older populations than ours and still
experience lower health care costs, and aging accounts for only a
small fraction of total cost growth)."' Medical malpractice. litigation
is far more extensive and expensive in the United States than in
other countries, though the direct cost of malpractice accounts for
less than two percent of health care costs, and the extent of the
indirect cost, i.e., "defensive medicine," is far from clear.69 A third
important consideration is that the health care sector is very labor
intensive, and increased productivity in labor-intensive industries
tends to increase, rather than decrease, costs.76
Perhaps the most important factor explaining higher costs in
the United States, however, is that we simply pay higher prices for
health care than other countries do. 7' Americans spend less time in
the hospital than do most Europeans and see the doctor about as
often.7 ' But we pay higher prices for the same brand name drugs
Traditional Physician-Patient Relationship be Preserved in the Era of Managed
Care or Should it be Replaced by a Group Ethic?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 619,
625 (1999).
66. See J. Steven Landefeld & Bruce T. Grimm, A Note on the Impact of
Hedonics and Computers on Real GDP, 80 SURv. CURRENT Bus. 17, 20 (2000).
67. Antonio P. Legorreta et al., Increased Cholecystectomy Rate After the
Introduction of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 270 JAMA 1429 passim (1993).
68. See BRADLEY C. STRUNK & PAUL B. GINSBURG, CENTER FOR STUDYING
HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, AGING PLAYS LIMITED ROLE IN HEALTH CARE COST
TRENDS (2002), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/473/473.pdf.
69. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/
0108-MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
70. This is called the Baumol effect, named after its discoverer, William J.
Baumol. See GRAHAM BANNOCK, R.E. BAXTER & EVAN DAVIS, DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICs 30 (1998).
71. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States
is so Different from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2003, at 89, 103.
72. Id. at 95, 97.
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than do other countries, our doctors earn more than do doctors in
other countries, and we pay far more for hospital care than anyone
else." The United States is in fact more efficient in its use of health
care resources than are other countries, but we pay much higher
prices for the resources we use.
'Why should this be true? Our fundamental problem is that we
have neither effective competition nor effective regulation for
holding down the cost of health care. In our economy we generally
rely on market competition to'set prices. Competition does not
necessarily guarantee that products are cheap, but it does more or
less ensure that we do not pay more for products than they are
worth to us. On the whole, moreover, markets generally ensure that
necessary goods are available at a price almost anyone can afford.
Markets have had little success in lowering the cost of health
care, however. How one explains this depends to a considerable
degree on one's political convictions. Conservative theorists assert
that the problem is fundamentally one of overinsurance."4 Given the
severe problems that our country experiences because of
underinsurance, the notion that we suffer also from overinsurance
seems surprising. It is intuitively obvious, however, that people will
consume more of a valued good if it is free or priced below its
marginal cost," and health insurance obviously reduces the cost of
health care to the ultimate consumer. There is also solid empirical
evidence of the effect of "moral hazard" on health care costs from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, conducted from 1974 to 1982,
and from other research conducted since.76 When consumers do not
care, or perhaps do not even know, what suppliers charge for a good
or service, suppliers can be expected to provide more of a good or
service than would otherwise be consumed and may charge higher77
prices than they would otherwise charge.
No one disputes that moral hazard is an issue in health care.
The dispute centers on how much of a problem it is and how to
73. Id. at 93, 97-98.
74. See, e.g., NEWT GINGRICH, WINNING THE FUTURE: A 21ST CENTURY
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 110-11 (2005); Michael Tanner, What's Wrong with the
Present System?, in EMPOWERING HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS THROUGH TAx
REFORM 27, (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., 1999); see also' COUNCIL OF EcON.
ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 108-145, at 194-
96 (2004) (arguing that excess insurance is a fundamental cause of high health
care costs in the United States).
75. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 74, at 195.
76. See generally JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993) (describing the experiment and
its findings).
77. See DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 6; Jost, supra note 9, at 25.
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address it. The same could be said of the market failures on which
observers with less faith in markets tend to focus. The two primary
failures on which these commentators tend to focus are information
deficiencies and agency problems." Markets depend on information.
Competition only works if consumers have information on price and
quality that permits them to make comparative judgments. It is
very difficult to evaluate health care quality comparatively,
however, because comparative information on which judgments on
the quality of health care providers could be made prospectively is
sparse and difficult to understand.7 9  Indeed, it is often difficult to
evaluate one's own experience with health care retrospectively-
perhaps one would have fared better without an intervention that
appears to have been a success or would have fared worse without
an intervention that seems to have been a failure. It is also often
very difficult to learn prospectively the price of health care services
because the price often depends on what is actually done and cannot
be known until the treatment is completed.80
Finally, markets depend on a certain degree of fungibility. In
the most price-competitive markets, those for commodities for
example, products are nearly perfectly fungible.81 In virtually all
competitive markets for consumer goods, however, products are
comparable in ways that,can usefully be described and measured, as
is demonstrated by any Consumer Reports chart. But the best
medical professionals are often possessed of gifts of empathy,
commitment, and intuition that are difficult to describe in a report
card. And each patient, and each patient's condition, is at some
level unique.9 2
The other problem with health care markets is that of agency.
While health care consumers usually make the initial decision as to
whether to seek health care, once they have gone to a health care
professional or institution, subsequent purchasing decisions-the
ordering of tests or consultations, referrals to specialists, prescribing
of drugs or devices, and admissions to hospitals-are usually
initiated by professionals. The interests of the professional agent of
the consumer, however, do not always align with those of the patient
principal. Particularly in situations where the professional is selling
his or her own services to the patient on a fee-for-service basis or is
78. THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 81-88, 134-43
(2d ed. 2003).
79. See id. at 81-88; see also DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 17-25.
80. See DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 6; Jost, supra note 9, at 25.
81. See Thomas G. Kelch & Howard J. Weg, Forward Contracts,
Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, and the Electricity Industry, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 66
(2005).
82. Sara Rosenbaum contributed this insight in a review of this Essay.
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referring or ordering a good or service from a provider or supplier in
which the professional has an investment interest or with which the
professional has a compensation arrangement,, there is the
possibility of a conflict of interest.83  While the extent of the
phenomena of physician-induced demand remains controversial, no
one seriously believes that all health care professionals are
motivated solely by the their patient's best interest when selling
their services. 4
Other factors also limit the effectiveness of competition in
health care. Both the hospital and the health insurance industries
are highly concentrated in some markets. The recent Federal Trade
Commission/Department of Justice report on competition in health
care, for example, notes that in both St. Louis and San Francisco,
four hospital systems control most of the hospitals, while in
Cleveland, two hospital chains control nearly seventy percent of
inpatient hospital capacity.85 The health insurance industry is far
more concentrated: in all but three states the largest three
insurance plans control over half of the insurance market, and in all
but fourteen states they control over sixty-five percent.86 Patents
and market exclusivity periods give monopoly power to brand name
drug manufacturers for considerable periods of time,87 while states
that have certificate of need ("CON") programs protect providers
with CONs from potential competitors.88
While there is much talk in the, United States about using
competition to control health care costs, there is little experience
with it elsewhere in the world.89 Most countries control health care
83. .See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS:
PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS 55-111 (1993) (discussing the range of
conflicts of interests faced by physicians to increase services).
84. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Theory of Physician-Induced Demand:
Reflections after a Decade, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 187, 189-91 (1985) (discussing
physician-induced demand); Thomas H. Rice & Roberta J. Labelle, Do
Physicians Induce Demand for Medical Services?, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
587, 587 (1989).
85. DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 11-12.
86. James C. Robinson, Consolidation and the Transformation of
Competition in Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 11, 14-15.
87. There is some competition among brand name drugs within the same
therapeutic class, however, and once patent and exclusivity periods expire and
generic drugs can be introduced, prices often drop dramatically. See CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICE AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27-32 (1998),
available at http.l/www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/Pharm.pdf.
88. DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 1-6.
89. See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Diane Dawson & Andrd den
Exter, The Role of Competition in Health Care: A Western European Perspective,
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costs through regulation. With respect to some health care products
and services, most often pharmaceuticals, this means price or profit
controls.9" In more and more countries, new technologies are also
subjected to evidence-based review before they are covered by public
insurance systems."
In most countries, however, costs are controlled through
budgets.92 Public insurers have global, or more often, sector-specific
budgets and either through planning or negotiation allocate these
budgets among health care products and services. How these
budgets work is further discussed below. In the United States, the
federal and state governments currently do not have a serious
regulatory program for controlling health care costs, except in public
programs.
C. Quality: The 44,000 Deaths
The third leg of the health policy triangle is quality. While we
have long known that the United States has more people without
access to health financing and pays more for health care than does
any other developed country, we have Still prided ourselves as
having "the best health care system in the world."93 Those who
make this claim seem to be saying that we have the smartest
doctors, the latest drugs, devices, and procedures, and the best-
equipped and shiniest hospitals.
In fact, however, a series of studies over the past decade and a
half, beginning with the Harvard New York hospital study94 and
culminating in the Institute of Medicine's reports, To Err is
Human 95 and Crossing the Quality Chasm,96 have revealed that the
quality of our health care system is seriously deficient. 'To Err is
Human reached the startling conclusion that from 44,000 to 98,000
Americans die every year from medical errors, more than those that
31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 685 (2006).
90. See Alan Maynard & Karen Bloor, Dilemmas in Regulation of the
Market for Pharmaceuticals, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2003, at 31, 37-39.
91. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 63
(describing these systems in eight countries).
92. See JOST, supra note 34, at 216-17, 243-48.
93. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5.
94. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991); Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of
Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study 11, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991).
95. IOM, To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 6.
96. IOM, QUALITY CHASM, supra note 6.
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die of breast cancer, AIDS, or automobile accidents.9" These reports,
and many others like them, amply document the fact that failures of
communication, coordination, knowledge, and sometimes sheer
incompetence, plague our health care system.
What should perhaps be most troubling to us, however, is
comparative quality data. We have long known that our mortality
and morbidity statistics do not compare favorably with other
developed countries. The average male in the United States, for
example, can at birth expect to live 74.5 years, while the average
British male can expect to live 76.2 years, the average German male
75.5 years, and the average Swedish male 77.9 years.98 Also, our
infant mortality rate of 6.8 deaths per thousand compares
unfavorably with British, Swedish, and German infant mortality
rates of 5.5, 3.7, and 4.3 deaths per thousand, respectively.99 But
mortality and morbidity rates depend on many things-diet,
education, housing conditions, and genetic predispositions, to name
a few-and are not necessarily determined by health care. Also, we
have long known that our mortality and morbidity rates are skewed
by the terrible statistics that describe the conditions of minority
groups in the United States. Although this fact should trouble and
embarrass us, it also means that the majority of white Americans,
who have the best access to our health care system, are reasonably
healthy.100
In the recent past, however, new studies have emerged that
examine directly and comparatively the processes and outcomes of
health care. These studies show that health care quality in the
United States is comparable to that in other countries.101 We do
some things very well, other things rather poorly, and perform at
about average levels in most things, just like other countries. As
97. IOM, To ERR IS HuMAN, supra note 6, at 1.
98. OECD, Life Expectancy at Birth, Females, Males, and Total Population
(Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/42/35530 0 71.xls (data available
for 2003).
99. OECD, Infant Mortality Rate, Deaths per 1,000 Live Births (Oct. 12,
2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/41/35530 0 8 3 .xls (data available for 2001).
100. In 2001, for example, white U.S. males had a life expectancy at birth of
75.0 years while African-American males had a life expectancy of 68.6 years;
infant mortality rates were 5.7 per thousand for whites and 13.6 per thousand
for African-Americans. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2004, at 132 tbl.19, 143
tbl.27 (2004).
101. See Cathy Schoen et al., Taking The Pulse of Health Care Systems:
Experiences of Patients with Health Problems in Six Countries, HEALTH AFF.-
WEB EXCLUSIVE, Nov. 3, 2005, at W5-509, W5-510, http://content.healthaffairs.
org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.509v3 (arguing that no country is
consistently best or worst across all dimensions of measurable health care).
55320061
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
one would expect given our abundance of specialists and high
technology equipment, we do well with conditions that require
dramatic interventions like treatments for breast or cervical
cancer.1"2 As one would also expect, however, given our fragmented
and uncoordinated health care system, we do not do so well with
chronic conditions that require careful monitoring over the long
term, like transplant maintenance.'03 We score highly at providingS 104
quick access to specialists and to elective procedures.
Surprisingly, however, we score poorly when access to primary care
is considered. While patients in New Zealand and Australia can
usually get same-day service when they need to see a primary care
physician, patients in the United States (and in Canada) often have
to wait.'0 '
It is more difficult to identify a fundamental cause of our quality
failures than it is to describe why we have problems with access and
cost. Many analyses of the problem (including the IOM reports),
however, point to system and coordination deficiencies.10 6 These
coordination failures often occur within institutions, resulting, for
example, in medication errors that cost us $2 billion every year.107
Coordination failures also exist within the larger health care
system, as when, for example, a patient with a chronic disease is
passed from one physician to another because the patient's employer
has changed insurers and thus provider networks or because the
patient changed employers and thus had to find a new physician in
the new employer's physician network.'08 The system provides few
incentives for taking a long-term approach to problems because it is
based on short-term relationships-insurance contracts are written
on a year-to-year basis. Thus, there is little reason for an insurer to
take steps that cost more now but might save money (or health)
102. Hussey et al., supra note 7, at 92 exh.1.
103. Id.
104. Robert J. Blendon et al., Common Concerns Amid Diverse Systems:
Health Care Experiences in Five Countries, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2003, at
106, 117 exh.7.
105. Schoen et al., supra note 7, at W4-491 exh.1. Patients in the United
States also have more difficulty in getting medical care in the evening, at night,
or over the weekend than do people from other countries and are much more
likely to forego medical care because of cost. Id.
106. IOM, QUALITY CHASM, supra note 6, at 4-9, 61.
107. IOM, To ERR IS HuMAN, supra note 6, at 2.
108. See Ming Tai-Seale, Voting with Their Feet: Patient Exit and Intergroup
Differences in Propensity for Switching Usual Source of Care, 29 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 491, 508 (2004) (identifying changes in insurance as a primary
reason for changing sources of care).
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later on because the patient is unlikely to then be the insurer's
responsibility.l'9
A larger problem, moreover, is that incentives for providing
high-quality care are rather weak. As already noted, in most parts
of the United States it is difficult for consumers to find information
that would allow them to identify the best quality providers."°
Neither public nor private insurance programs do much to reward
high-quality providers or to punish those who provide substandard
care by "paying for performance.""' We do have licensure,
certification, and accreditation programs in place that are supposed
to ensure that professionals have the basic knowledge and providers
have the basic structural capacity to provide adequate quality
care..12  These programs have not, however, been successful at
assuring high-quality care, nor are they designed to do so."3
Clearly, if we do have the "best health care system in the world"
(and no one knows whether this is true), it is not because the quality
of our health care is particularly admirable, but rather because
other nations are also struggling to get a handle on how to identify
and to achieve high-quality health care and on how to avoid medical
errors.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Over the past half century, our country has built a complex
framework of laws to try to address the problems that plague our
badly flawed health care system. Beginning with the common law of
tort and contract and a handful of public health and professional
licensure statutes, we have constructed a sometimes almost
109. CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS,
AND POLICYMAKERS 31-32 (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004) [hereinafter
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE].
110. DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 17-18.
111. Id. at 26. Although there are as of yet few operational "pay for
performance" programs, there is considerable support for "pay for performance"
in health care. See generally Robert A. Berenson, Paying for Quality and Doing
It Right, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315 (2003); David A. Hyman & Charles
Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for Health Care,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001). Others believe, however, that it would be
difficult to do well and may not be a good idea. See Bruce C. Vladeck, If Paying
for Quality is Such a Bad Idea, Why is Everyone for It?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1345 (2003).
112. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of
Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525, 542-53,
582-87 (1988).
113. At best, they may be able to assure that care is of minimal quality. Id.;
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation,
Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 825, 858-66 (1995).
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impenetrable maze of laws to enhance access, control cost, and
oversee quality. Though the programs and approaches that these
laws have created have enjoyed some notable successes, they havemm 114
so far failed, on the whole, to solve the problems that they address.
A comprehensive description of this web of law would fill
volumes, but an attempt will be made here to sketch out their barest
outlines as an introduction to the discussion that follows, which
considers how to reform this body of law to bring it in line with
policies that might actually achieve our health care goals."'
Recognizing that many of these laws address multiple policy
concerns, the laws will be classified in terms of whether they
primarily concern access, cost, or quality.
A. Laws that Promote Access to Care
Measured simply by sheer volume of legislative and regulatory
output, it would seem that our most substantial health policy
concern has been access to health care. Laws that promote access
fall into four categories: (1) laws that establish and guide the
functioning of health care financing programs; (2) tax laws that
create incentives for increasing access to health care; (3) state and
federal regulatory programs directed at expanding access to private
health insurance; and (4) federal and state laws that encourage
health care providers to provide free or reduced cost care to
indigents.
Though we think of our health care system as fundamentally
private in character, almost half of health care in the United States
is paid for directly by public insurance programs, compared to only a
little over a third financed by private health insurance.116 If one
includes the cost of direct health care financing programs (such as
Medicare, Medicaid, the Veteran's Administration, or public
hospitals), the cost of tax subsidies provided to finance private
health insurance, and the money the federal and state governments
pay to insure their own employees, the government's share of the
total health care budget climbs almost to sixty percent."7 Indeed,
114. The health care industry, as our nation's largest business, is also
governed by a host of other laws that have little to do with health policy, such
as labor laws, business organization law, and consumer protection law, though
even these laws often take on specific characteristics when applied to the health
care industry.
115. For a more comprehensive effort, see generally FURROW ET AL., supra
note 8.
116. To be exact, 45.1% was covered by public funds and 35.1% by private
health insurance in 2004. Smith et al., supra note 3, at 188 exh.2.
117. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National
Health Insurance-And Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 88, 91
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the United States spends more public money on health care per
capita than any other country in the world spends per capita on
health care in total from all funds, public and private.118
Local government programs for providing health care to
indigents existed before the founding of the Republic."9  Serious
proposals for a national universal public health insurance program
emerged in the 1910s, and federal attempts to encourage state
indigent health care programs through subsidies date back to the
1950s.120  The watershed moment in the history of public health
insurance in the United States, however, was 1965, when Congress
adopted the Medicare and Medicaid programs.'2 '
Medicare is a federal program that resembles the social
insurance programs of Europe. It is unusual in the international
context in that it covers only the elderly and disabled, but is similar
to the programs of other countries in that it is not means tested (or
at least has not been until very recently)122 and is funded in part by
payroll taxes."23
The Medicare statute entitles most residents of the United
States who are over age sixty-five, have been disabled for at least
two years, or have end-stage renal disease to payment for hospital
care, physician services, hospice care, home health care, a very
limited amount of skilled nursing care, durable medical equipment,
and a variety of other professional services and medical supplies."1
4
As of January 1, 2006, the program also covers prescription drugs.125
Medicare beneficiaries can receive services either through the
traditional Medicare fee-for-service program or through Medicare
Advantage managed-care plans, which must provide the full range
exh.2 (stating that the government's share of the total health care budget in
1999 was 59.8%).
118. Id. at 93 exh.5.
119. JOST, supra note 34, at 67.
120. Id. at 72-77, 80-86.
121. See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 45-86 (2d ed.
2000).
122. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.
2066, means tests Medicare in two respects: first by imposing higher Part B
premiums on higher income beneficiaries and second by imposing lower
premiums and cost-sharing obligations in the Part D prescription drug benefit
program on lower income beneficiaries. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Most
Important Health Care Legislation of the Millennium (So Far): The Medicare
Modernization Act, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 437, 445 (2005).
123. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1401(b), 3101(b), 3111(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(a)
(2000). Medicare Part B is funded through general revenue funds and
premiums paid by beneficiaries.
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426(a)(1), 426(b)(2), 426-1, 1395c, 1395d, 1395x(s) (2000).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (West Supp. 2005).
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of Medicare services and may provide additional services.126 The
Medicare program imposes fairly stiff cost-sharing requirements,127
and most beneficiaries have some form of supplemental insurance,
such as Medicaid, retiree benefits, or a stand-alone Medicare
supplement policy, to cover these cost-sharing obligations.128
Medicare benefits are also in general subject to limits; Medicare is
not a catastrophic program.1
2 9
Most physicians, as well as other professionals and providers,
participate in Medicare, and Medicare beneficiaries have free choice
of these providers except insofar as the beneficiaries voluntarily
enroll in a Medicare Advantage managed care plan that limits their
choice.'20  Medicare is administered at the street level by private
contractors who process claims.12 1  Traditional Medicare pays
providers based on administered price systems. The prices it pays
are generally based on relative value schedules constructed by
comparing the resources consumed in producing a particular service
or bundle of services to those consumed in producing other services
or bundles of services. The "weights" reached through this process
are then multiplied by a conversion factor arrived at through
economic predictions and political negotiation to determine actual
1322payment amounts. Medicare beneficiaries and providers are
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a)(1), 1395w-22(a)(1) (2000).
127. The Part A deductible for 2006 is $952, the Part B deducible $124, and
the Part B coinsurance obligation for physicians visits and most other services
is twenty percent. See Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet, Medicare
Premiums and Deductibles for 2006 (Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1557.
128. Mary A. Laschober et al., Trends in Medicare Supplemental Insurance
and Prescription Drug Coverage, 1996-1999, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Feb.
27, 2002, at W3-127, W3-129, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/contentlfulll
hlthaff.w2.127vl/DC1 (noting that approximately fifty-seven percent of
beneficiaries have either free-standing or retiree supplemental policies).
129. For example, the program only covers ninety days of hospital care per
spell of illness, plus a one-time sixty-day "life time reserve" period. 42 U.S.C. §
1885d(a) (2000).
130. As of 2002, ninety-six percent of physicians in the United States were
accepting some Medicare patients. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 74-75 (2003),
http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Mar03-Ch2B.pdf.
131. These claims processors are currently called intermediaries for Part A
and carriers for Part B, but under the Medicare Modernization Act will be
called in the future simply Medicare contractors.
132. The two most important of these prospective payments systems, the
diagnosis-related groups prospective payment system for hospitals and the
resource-based relative value scale for physicians, are described in FURROW ET
AL., supra note 8, §§ 11-10, 11-16, 11-20.
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protected by numerous multilayered appeal processes, and
ultimately by judicial review, though the courts are reluctant to
second-guess the decisions of those who administer the program.
The Medicaid program is jointly administered and financed by
the federal and state governments to provide health care for those
who are without the income or assets needed to pay for health care,
and who have a good excuse for being in this condition.'. Medicaid
began as a program to provide federal subsidies to the states for
covering welfare recipients, but the courts interpreted the Medicaid
statute as creating a federal entitlement for recipients and
providers, a decision subsequently endorsed by Congress.'3 5 In fact,
however, the Medicaid program is subject to a great deal of state
discretion-only some recipients and some services must be covered
by the states, while many coverage and benefit categories are
optional.
State Medicaid programs must cover people who are over sixty-
five, disabled, or blind who -received federal Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI") grants,1 36 as well as pregnant women, and children
under the age of six whose families earn less than 133% of the
poverty level,'37 and children aged, six to eighteen whose families
earn less than 100% of the poverty level.'3 8 State Medicaid programs
must also cover in whole or in part Medicare premiums and cost-
sharing requirements of Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes fall
below certain levels.13 9  Federal law permits state Medicaid
programs, moreover, to cover a host of additional categories of
indigent persons at their option, and coverage varies dramatically
from State to state.' 40 Indeed, the only real federal limit on the
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2000); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing
Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L.REv. 39, 45-55, 60-65 (1999).
134. See generally ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK (2002), http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/2236-index.cfm.
135. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid
Entitlement, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 145, 145-46.
136. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) (2000). States may at their option use more
restrictive income eligibility standards than the SSI program, as long as those
standards are not more restrictive than those the state used on January 1,
1972. Id. § 1396a(f).
137. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV), 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VI).
138. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VI).
139. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(E). Several other categories of poor people must also
be covered by state Medicaid programs, including some parents of poor families
and a number of categories of disabled people. For a full description, see
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 134, at 3-48.
140. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 12-2(b), at 590; SCHNEIDER ET AL.,
supra note 134, at 3-48.
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states is that they (generally) may not cover healthy, able-bodied
adults under the age of sixty-five who are not responsible for
children.
State Medicaid programs must cover a fairly limited list of
essential medical services, including hospital, physician, and skilled
nursing care,'4' but most states provide a more generous catalogue of
services, recognizing that Medicaid recipients are rarely capable of
paying any significant amount for health care out of pocket.
Medicaid provider payments are at this point largely unregulated by
federal law and vary significantly from state to state, though they
are very low almost everywhere. Medicaid does provide, however,
significant financial support to safety-net hospitals that also serve
the uninsured through disproportionate share payments.'
Medicaid is supplemented by SCHIP, which provides funds to the
states to provide health insurance for children in families with
incomes up to 200% of the federal poverty level."' SCHIP does not
afford a legal entitlement to its recipients. Medicare and Medicaid
are supplemented by a host of smaller (though by no means small)
federal and state health care programs, including the Veterans'
Administration, the Department of Defense Tricare program, the
Indian Health Services, federally-funded Community Health
Centers, programs funded under the Ryan White Comprehensive
AIDS Resources Emergency ("CARE") Act,14' state and local public
hospitals, and workers' compensation programs. Most of these
programs, which collectively cost over $245 billion in 2004,146 exist to
cover populations that have some special claim to publicly financed
health care, but would otherwise fall between the cracks in our
141. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a).
142. These payments are supposed to cover the additional costs incurred by
hospitals that serve predominantly poorer, and thus presumably sicker,
populations. § 1396r-4 (2000). Medicare also subsidizes safety-net hospitals
through "disproportionate share" payments and by paying to cover the
education costs of teaching hospitals, which also tend to disproportionately
serve the poor. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(B), (d)(5)(F). The Institute of
Medicine estimates that these subsidies amounted to $14.2 billion in 2001.
INST. OF MED., HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 54 tbl.3.5
(2003), available at http://newton.nap.edu/books/030908931X/html/54.html
[hereinafter IOM, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST].
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (2000).
144. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Devolution of Authority and Public Health
Insurance Design: National SCHIP Study Reveals an Impact on Low-Income
Children, 1 HouS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33, 36 (2001).
145. Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990).
146. See Smith et al., supra note 3, at 188 exh.2 (indicating that "other
federal" programs cost $118 billion and "other state and local" programs cost
$127.7 billion in 2004).
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health care financing system.
Our third largest federal health care program is the tax subsidy
for employment-based insurance. The amount that employers pay
for employee benefits for .their employees is a non-taxed business
expense to the employer, but neither the value of employer-provided
insurance nor the value of its benefits are taxed as income to
employees once it is received. The employment-related health
insurance subsidy is estimated to have been worth $202.5 billion in
2004.'47
The value of this tax subsidy to any individual obviously turns
on that individual's marginal tax rate-the wealthy -find the
program very beneficial while those with low incomes get little if
any tax benefit from the subsidy."4' But the existence of the
program, as well as nondiscrimination provisions in the tax- laws,
1 4 9
has encouraged employers to provide health insurance for all
employees, and thus the subsidy indirectly helps out individuals too
poor to receive a tax benefit from the program. Insuring individuals
through their place of employment also permits the creation of large
risk-sharing groups and discourages risk selection, thus also helping
out higher-risk individuals. But the system also has its drawbacks.
Notably, the employment-insurance link results in job. lock, as one
may have to stay at the same job to avoid having to change
providers or even to avoid losing insurance.15
0
147. Richard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health
Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 McGEORGE L.
REV. 535, 544 (2005). Money that the employer contributes for health insurance
is not only excluded from the employee and employer's income tax but also from
Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes, which for most workers is more
important since two-thirds of workers pay more in payroll than income tax. Id.
at 543-44.
148. John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits
in 2004, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Feb. 25, 2004, at W4-106, W4-109 to -10
exh.2, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.106vl/DC1; see
also CLAUDIA WILLIAMS, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., TAX SUBSIDIES FOR
PRIVATE INSURANCE: WHO CURRENTLY BENEFITS AND WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR NEW POLICIES? 2 (2003), available at http://www.rwjf.org/publications/
synthesis/reports-and_briefs/pdf/no3_policyprimer.pdf.
149. The federal tax code prohibits self-insured employers from providing
highly compensated employees with health insurance benefits superior to those
provided to lower-paid employees. 26 U.S.C. § 105(h) (2000).
150. The problem of job lock was a target of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936,
which limits the imposition of preexisting conditions clauses by a new insurer
when an. employee changes employment. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (2000). HIPAA,
however, does not solve the problem of a person who is insured through an
employer and wants to move to a job with another employer who does not offer
health insurance or wants to become self-employed.
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The success of employee-benefit tax subsidies has led to a
variety of further attempts to use tax-based programs to expand
access, an approach that is currently very popular. The Health
Savings Account ("HSA") program'.' attempts to use tax subsidies to
encourage individuals to establish savings accounts for health care
expenditures coupled with high-deductible insurance policies. A
small federal tax credit program was adopted in 2003 to help
persons displaced by trade agreements.15 2
The merits of HSA and tax credit approaches are discussed
below."'5 One consideration must be noted here, however: a major
advantage of the employee-benefit tax subsidy has been the
simplicity of its administration. As tax-based strategies become
more complex, however, the IRS may be increasingly drawn into
administering the program-deciding, for example, what services
can be paid for by a HSA. The prospect of the IRS being the prime
agency regulating our health care system gives one pause.
The third category of access-promoting laws includes a host of
state and federal laws that require insurers to cover individuals,
services, or providers that they would not cover or on terms the
insurers would not accept if they were not required to do so by
law.' 54  HIPAA,' 5 for example, limits the use of preexisting
conditions clauses, a tool that insurers have long used to discourage
adverse selection.' It also requires insurers that insure in the
small group market to guarantee issue and renewal to all small
employer groups, though it does not address the rates at which
small group insurance must be offered.157 Finally, HIPAA included a
modest attempt to ensure that persons who lost long-term insurance
coverage could get access to the individual insurance market,
though that provision has been largely undermined by provisions
151. 26 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
152. The program has had disappointing results. In 2003, only 19,410 of the
estimated 200,000 to 250,000 persons eligible for the program enrolled. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH COVERAGE TAX CREDIT: SIMPLIFIED AND MORE
TIMELY ENROLLMENT PROCESS COULD INCREASE PARTICIPATION 5, 21 (2004).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 279-319.
154. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 9-4(c), at 476-78; Mark A. Hall, The
Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reforms, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 685 (1999); Jost, supra note 33, at 463-68.
155. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)(1) (2000). HIPAA does not forbid the use of
preexisting conditions clauses, but rather limits their duration (to twelve
months or less in most instances) in group plans and limits their application to
individuals who are moving from one job to another or who have been insured
for at least eighteen months and are now seeking individual insurance.
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-11(a), 300gg-12(a) (2000).
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allowing states to substitute other approaches to coverage."' The
federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
("COBRA") 159 requires employment-based insurance to cover certain
employees and their dependents for one-and-a-half to three years
after their coverage otherwise terminates if the employee pays a
premium equal to 102% of the cost of the insurance.'16
State laws go further. A few states require insurers to offer
insurance to all small groups or individuals in the same geographic
region at the same rate (community rating) or at rates modified only
to take into account age and gender.16' Other states limit the extent
to which insurers can vary premium costs among insureds."' Many
states have also established high-risk pools to make insurance
available to persons who cannot otherwise afford it.'6 State laws
impose a host of mandates requiring insurers to cover particular
products or services (such as alcohol treatment or mammography
screening), the services of particular providers (such as
chiropractors or optometrists), or certain individuals (adopted
children or newborns).'6 Yet other laws limit the ability of insurers
to control adverse selection through waiting periods or preexisting
conditions clauses, while others limit the discretion of insurers to
exclude providers from their networks or require insurers to provide
internal or external review procedures before they can deny
coverage for medical services or products.'6'
While these regulatory statutes undoubtedly make insurance
available to some who would otherwise not be insured, and review
procedures make a good deal of sense from the standpoint of making
sure that insureds are treated fairly, any effort to dictate insurance
coverage or underwriting practices is problematic. Insurers that are
required to lower their rates for high-risk insureds will necessarily
158. Id. §§ 300gg-41 to -42, 300gg-44; see also FURROW ETAL., supra note 8, §
9-4, at 474, § 9-7, at 489.
159. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986).
160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2000).
161. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 613 (5th ed. 2004); see also Mark V. Pauly & Allison M. Percy, Cost
and Performance: A Comparison of the Individual and Group Health Insurance
Markets, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 9,22 (2000).
162. This is usually done through the application of rating bands, which
limit the ratio of the highest premiums charged to the lowest. See FURROW ET
AL., supra note 161, at 613.
163. See TOM MCCORMACK, HEALTH ADMIN. RESPONSIBILITY PROJECT, STATE
HIGH RISK HEALTH INSURANCE POOLS, http://www.harp.org/shrhip.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006).
164. FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 9-4(b), at 474-76.
165. See generally FuRROW ET AL., supra note 161, at 609-37.
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have to raise their rates forb other insureds to break even.1 66 If
insurers are forced to cover services or providers they would not
otherwise have covered, they must raise their rates for everyone. Of
course, there are sometimes justifications based in market failures
or behavioral psychology for requiring insurers to provide coverage
that insureds may not otherwise insist on, but many mandates seem
more easily explained by public-choice economics than by
decisionmaking heuristics.'6 7 In any event, it is ironic that, on the
one hand, we insist on sticking with a private insurance-based
health care financing system because of our belief in the superiority
of private markets, but, on the other, use regulation to conscript
private insurers to provide insurance to all comers in violation of the
underwriting principles that competitive markets require private
insurers to use.
1 6 8
Finally, federal and state law alternatively encourage or compel
health care providers to provide health care to all who need it,
regardless of the patient's ability to pay. Historically this has been
done through tax subsidies, which the federal and state
governments have long used to encourage hospitals (and a few other
providers) to offer free or reduced-cost care 69  These tax subsidies
include not only income tax exemptions but also exemptions from
sales and property tax, as well as the provision of access to tax-
exempt bond financing and donations. While these subsidies have
undoubtedly resulted in a substantial amount of uncompensated
care, what exactly a hospital needs to do to become a "charity" is far
from clear in most states'70 since many "charitable" hospitals
continue to aggressively pursue the collection of the maximum
amount possible against indigent patients.'' Federal tax-exempt
166. This is true unless they are otherwise earning rents and are willing to
give them up.
167. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care
"Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and
Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999); Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall,
Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of Managed Care, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2002) (examining the extent to which managed
care regulation responds to these problems).
168. See Jost, supra note 33, at 483-92.
169. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 2-1 to -16, at 38-57 (exploring the
complexities of the charitable tax deduction for health care facilities).
170. See, e.g., BRADLEY E. KARLIN & T.J. SULLIVAN, COAL. FOR NONPROFIT
HEALTH CARE, REDEFINING THE COMMUNITY BENEFIT STANDARD: STATE LAW
APPROACHES TO ENSURING THE SocIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF NONPROFIT HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATIONS (1999).
171. Jonathan Cohn, Uncharitable?, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Dec. 19, 2004, at 51,
51-52.
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status has also resulted in considerable IRS oversight of hospital
172business practices.
The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act ("EMTALA")'` is much clearer in its demands. Any hospital
with an emergency room that accepts Medicare must screen and
stabilize any person who comes to the hospital in an emergency,
regardless of the ability of that person to pay.'7 4 This does not mean
that the hospital has to provide the service for free-it can
aggressively pursue collection later (which undoubtedly deters many
indigents from taking advantage of the law). It also does not mean
that the hospital has to help out a person with a serious health
problem that does not constitute an emergency."'. Most cancer
therapy or maintenance treatment for chronic diseases is not
covered by EMTALA. 176 But it does provide a safety net for many
who are not insured and cannot otherwise afford care.
Ultimately, the federal bankruptcy code must also be seen as
our federal catastrophic health care program. Health care expenses
are among the leading causes of bankruptcy in the United States.
177
While bankruptcy allows a family crippled by medical debt to get on
with life, it does nothing to guarantee future access to care; indeed,
it may discourage providers from extending credit for further
treatment in the future.
B. Laws to Control Cost
As already noted, we currently have no national strategy to
control health care costs. Our output of cost-control laws and
regulatory programs, therefore, has been relatively modest
compared to the volume of laws we have produced addressing access
to carer The one and only major federal effort at cost control-to
actually be enacted into law was the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974,178 which was repealed'a decade
172. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 2-4 to -15, at 43-57.
173. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 164 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2000)).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 10-2 to -12,
at 512-23.
175. Teufel v. United States, No. 89-1272-K, 1992 WL 160908, at *5 (D. Kan.
June 15, 1992).'
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (2000).
177. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 41, at W5-69; Melissa B. Jacoby, The
Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REv.
453, 456 (2004).
178. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225.
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later and survives in the CON statutes of a diminishing number of
states.'
7 9
All employee benefit plans are governed by the Employees
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").' 80 ERISA,
enacted originally to address scandals involving underfunded and
mismanaged pension funds, also extends federal authority to cover
employee health benefit plans."8' ERISA regulations govern benefit
plan disclosures and internal review procedures,'82 while ERISA
itself provides a cause of action in federal court for employees denied
benefits by ERISA plans.'83 The greatest impact of ERISA, however,
has probably been deregulatory. Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts
all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. 84 While
§ 514(b)(2)(A) saves from preemption all state laws regulating
insurance, § 514(b)(2)(B) has been interpreted to forbid the states
from regulating self-insured plans as insurers.'8' The United States
Supreme Court has also interpreted § 502 of ERISA to exclude any
state contract, tort, or statutory remedies against ERISA plans that
would supplement or supplant ERISA's federal cause of action.' 1
86
Though ERISA's preemption provisions have caused the courts
a great deal of confusion, their most important effect has been to
limit the extent to which state law can impose obligations or liability
on employee benefit plans. A plan beneficiary who suffers serious
health consequences from being denied a benefit by an employee
benefits plan, for example, cannot sue in state court for millions of
dollars for bad faith breach of contract, but is instead limited to
recovery of the cost of the benefit in a § 502 action in federal court.'87
179. See Elena Salerno Flash et al., Certificate of Need Regulation, in 1
HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION § 7, at 7-3 (Mark A.
Hall ed., 1999) (describing state CON programs).
180. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (2000)).
181. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel S. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA:
Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 47, 48-52 (1988)
(describing the history of ERISA preemption); Leon E. Irish & Harrison J.
Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 112-16 (1985) (describing the-expansive ERISA preemption
clause). ý .... .
182. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-3 (plan descriptions), 2570.141 (2005) (review
procedures).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
184. Id. § 1144(a) (2000).
185. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 452 U.S. 52, 63 (1990).
186. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004); Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
187. Davila, 542 U.S. at 210; see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Supreme
Court Limits Lawsuits Against Managed Care Organizations, HEALTH AFF.-WEB
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A state can require an insured employee benefit plan to cover
substance abuse services or chiropractors, but if it does so the
employer can walk away from the state requirement by self-
insuring.18 ERISA, therefore, gives employers some control over
their costs, and thus probably makes it marginally more likely that
employers will offer employee benefit plans."8 9
The antitrust laws can also be seen as a legal strategy for
controlling health care costs. Though the antitrust laws have only
been applied to health care professionals since 1975, when the
Supreme Court decided that professionals were engaged in
"commerce,"' 90 the health care industry has been one of the most
active arenas for enforcement of the antitrust laws for the past
generation. Antitrust law has had. its successes: health care
professionals and institutions no longer get together to fix prices and
allocate markets like they used,to and .physician attempts to form
unions to extract higher prices from managed care plans have
largely come to naught.'9' A few hospital mergers that might
otherwise have gone through have been averted,'92 and professionals
are much freer to advertise than they used to be. But the majority
of antitrust lawsuits over -the past, two decades have been brought by
disgruntled physicians who have been denied or lost staff privileges
or exclusive contracts, and most of these cases have been losers.' 93
Although the government had some success in challenging hospital
mergers early on, it has lost most of the cases it has brought since
1995, often because the courts accepted bizarrely broad geographic
market definitions.'94 In short, it is difficult to discern a significant
effect that antitrust enforcement is having at this point in time on
EXCLUSIVE, Aug. 11, 2004, at W4-417, W4-417, http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.417vl.
188. This is the meaning of the "deemer" clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
(2000), which prohibits states from regulating self-insured plans.
189. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 401-02 (2002)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that ERISA's exclusive federal remedy is
intended to free employers from state insurance regulation and thus to
encourage them to voluntarily provide health benefits).
190. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (finding that
lawyers, and thus other professionals, were engaged in commerce and covered
by the Sherman Act).
191. William S. Brewbaker III, Physician Unions and the Future of
Competition in the Health Care Sector, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 545, 551, 555
(2000).
192. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital
Antitrust Law, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 88, 89.
193. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality,
and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 567-70 (2002).
194. Hammer & Sage, supra note 192, at 90.
56720061.
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
restraining health care costs.
The enforcement of the federal and state health care fraud and
abuse laws, on the other hand, seems to have had a restraining
effect on the growth of the health care costs, at least in government
health care programs.19 " The federal civil and criminal False Claims
Acts196 impose stiff penalties on those who attempt to cheat federal
and state health care programs, and the qui tam provisions of the
federal civil False Claims Act encourage knowledgeable insiders to
expose secret fraud and corruption.'9 7 Federal False Claims Act
enforcement can be understood as utilization review on the cheap.
The federal government, in contrast to private insurers, examines
few claims closely, but when it finds false claims it comes down hard
on the violator, thus creating a significant deterrent to dishonest
claiming practices.'9 ' The federal bribe and kickback' 99 and self-
referral statutes and regulations,2"' although they complicate even
the simplest health care transactions, also weaken incentives
providers face to provide unnecessary services.
20 1
A number of states have attempted to address the particular
problem of high drug costs by forming purchasing pools or by
encouraging generic drug substitution.20 2  The federal Hatch-
Waxman Act2e" also attempts to encourage the market entry of
generics by providing protected markets through market exclusivity
195. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV.
239, 257 (1999).
196. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat.
3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000)).
197. Section 3729 provides for civil penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 per claim
plus treble damages against those who knowing present false claims or use
false records or statements to make claims to the federal government. See Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
Section 3730(b)-(c) provides for private qui tam actions to enforce these
provisions.
198. Jost & Davies, supra note 195, at 278-80. Multimillion-dollar civil
penalty settlements under the statue are now common. Id. at 242.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
200. Id. §§ 1395nn, 1396b(s) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353 (2005).
201. See ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE, 67-
248 (2004) (describing these laws).
202. See NATYL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE PHARMACEUTICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 26 (2006), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/
drugaid.htm; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PHARMACEUTICAL
BULK PURCHASING: MULTI-STATE AND INTER-AGENCY PLANS, 2005, at 1 (2005)
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/bulkrx.htm.
203. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman)
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of
15, 21, and 35 U.S.C.).
568 [Vol. 41
OUR BROKEN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
periods for new generics under some circumstances.20 4 Attempts to
outsource drug price regulation to Canada and other countries have
been largely blocked by the Food and Drug Administration,
supported by federal legislation.
20 5
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, public insurance
programs control their own costs through their administered price
systems. These have been quite successful in recent years in
holding down costs for, those programs, though it is widely believed
that these measures result in cost-shifting to the private sector,
which accordingly experiences increased costs. 2"6 The private sector,207
on the other hand, also copies measures used by public programs.
Thus, public efforts at cost control may have some beneficial spill-
over to the private sector. On the whole, however, the private sector
is on its own for controlling costs, with little assistance from
regulation.
C. Laws that Provide Quality Oversight
If our output of legislation directed at lowering the *cost of
health care has been comparatively meager, even less legislation
has been forthcoming intended to improve the quality of health care.
Though quality oversight was the earliest province of health law,
law in this area continues to develop slowly.
This is the one area of health law where the common law
continues to hold sway. Medical negligence litigation, based on
classic tort law (though in many states affected by "malpractice
reform" legislation) is intended to deter negligent medical error and
to compensate its victims. 20 8 In recent decades, the reach of medical
204. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(D), 355(j)(5)(D) (2000).
205. The most recent legislation, included in the Medicare Modernization
Act, authorized drug importation but only if the FDA could assure the safety of
imported drugs. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1121, 117 Stat. 2066, 2464-65. The FDA has
refused to make this finding. See Valerie Jablow, Consumers, States Challenge
Federal Ban on Drug Imports, 40 TRIAL 12 (2004).
206. See Paul B. Ginsburg, Can Hospitals and Physicians Shift the Effects of
Cuts in Medicare Reimbursement to Private Payers?, HEALTH AFF.-WEB
EXCLUSIVE, Oct. 8, 2003, at W3-472, W3-472, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprintfhlthaff.w3.472v1.pdf.
207. See DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 8; Uwe E. Reinhardt,
Breaking American Health Policy Gridlock, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 96,
99.
208. See Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1931-32,
1939-40, 1985 (2003); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of
Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or
Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 915-17 (2005) (exploring the
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negligence litigation has expanded through theories of corporate
negligence and vicarious liability to cover health care institutions
(including, in some states and under certain circumstances,
managed care organizations), as well as professionals.20 9
Institutional liability has in turn spurred institutional risk
210management programs.
Most commentators agree that our current malpractice system
fares poorly as a compensation system. It does little for those who
suffer noncatastrophic injuries and imposes very high transaction
costs.2" Even those who suffer catastrophic injuries are often notf u l l _ . 2 1 1
fully compensateda. It is also not clear that the current system.. 213
does much to deter error or encourage quality. Malpractice
remains a perennial political football, however, as trial lawyers are
one of the mainstays of the Democratic Party, while organized
medicine and business interests give generously to the Republican
Party whenever the tocsin of tort reform is sounded. Academics, for
their part, regularly push no-fault compensation systems 14 or
enterprise liability,2"5 but their advice falls largely on deaf ears.21 6
deterrent potential of malpractice litigation).
209. FURROW ETAL., supra note 8, § 7-2, at 375, § 7-4, at 386.
210. Id. § 4-24, at 128.
211. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 24, 186-98 (1985); PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ON TRIAL 13, 61-69 (1991).
212. Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of
Injuries in Medical Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 158 (1991).
213. Indeed, some commentators argue that medical malpractice litigation
hinders attempts to deal with medical error by masking the systemic problems
that cause error. See Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance
and Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems
Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501,
527-31 (2004).
214. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising
from Medical Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21
(1975) (arguing that no-fault liability could be effectively applied to the medical
profession); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable
Model of "No-Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27
AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001) (suggesting methods of implementing a no-fault
compensation system).
215. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical
Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 381,382-84 (1994); Barry. R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care
Reform: Managing Care and Managing Risk, 39 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 79, 80 (1994).
216. Virginia and Florida have adopted no-fault systems for cases involving
brain-damaged infants. See David G. Duff, Compensation for Neurologically
Impaired Infants: Medical No-Fault in Virginia, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 391, 391-
92 (1990). The federal government also has a no-fault compensation program
for injuries caused by vaccines. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
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The other classic legal approach to quality oversight is
professional and institutional licensure. To become qualified to
practice their professions, health care professionals must fulfill
specific educational requirements, pass a licensure examination,
and be of good "character.",217 Licensure assures that health care
professionals possess, at least at one point in time, a specific
knowledge base relevant to their practice. Licensure agencies can
also, at least in theory, discipline their licensees for incompetence or
for unethical conduct, though they seldom do.218
Private accreditation and certification bodies, such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
("JCAHO") or the medical specialty boards, offer further credentials.
Professional certification is based on the acquisition of additional
knowledge and experience beyond the basic level required for
licensure, and in some cases on periodic demonstration of ongoing
competence.219 Institutional accreditation requires the fulfillment of
additional structural (and sometimes process and outcome)
requirements on an ongoing basis.22° Accredited hospitals can
participate in Medicare on the basis of their accreditation; thus the
Medicare program encourages private efforts at improving quality.
2 2'
There is little firm evidence, however, that accreditation in fact
improves quality, though it would seem to assure the basic
structural foundation for providing quality care.
Finally, some efforts are being made to generate and
disseminate information about quality and error. The National
Practitioner Data Bank, for example, accumulates data on
malpractice settlement and judgments, hospital staff privilege
222 t r odecisions, and professional discipline actions. These data are not
available to the public, however, but rather only to hospitals,
managed care organizations, and licensure boards.222 Some public
agencies are beginning to collect or require the collection of data to
1986, Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat; 3756 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
300aa-1 to aa-34 (2000)).
217. Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare,
Professionals, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 17, 21 (Timothy
S. Jost ed., 1997).
218. Id. at 21-32.
219. See Jost, supra note 112, at 542-52 (discussing the role of certification
in quality oversight).
220. Timothy S. Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 17 (1994).
221. Id, at 15; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e), 1395bb (2000).
222. See id. §§ 11131-11133 (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2005).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 60.13 (2005).
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be made available to the public for purchasing decisions, but this
information remains sparse and primitive.224
In sum, despite a great deal of discussion about quality
oversight in recent years, little has been accomplished yet in terms
of implementing a strategy to assure or improve it, at either the
state or federal level.
D. Legal Approaches: An Initial Assessment
As one looks over this body of law, one is struck again by its ad
hoc nature. The common law foundation has indeed in all areas-
other than medical negligence law-been buried Under layers of
legislation and regulation, but in most instances statutes were
adopted to address a particular problem at a particular time, often
without careful consideration of how the new law would interact
with existing statutes. These laws also reflect different
understandings of how our health care system functions and should
function, and different philosophies as to how to improve its
functioning.
This ad hoc approach to lawmaking has resulted occasionally in
intractable conflicts. Some of these conflicts are played out in the
arena of federalism-for example, the battle between ERISA
preemption and state insurance regulation 25 or between federal
Medicaid law and state Medicaid program administration.226 Others
exist because of conflicting policy goals within a single government
program-for example, federal pharmaceutical policy pursues both
the goal of encouraging innovation through intellectual property
protection, on the one hand, and the goal of promoting cost control
through encouraging generic competition, on the other. State
malpractice law, many believe, encourages physicians to conceal
error and thus discourages attempts to deal with error through peer
review or systems improvements, which are otherwise encouraged
by state law.227
Our ad hoc production of law also results in considerable
redundancy. Federal insurance mandates overlay state insurance
mandates; federal Medicare institutional certification requirements
coexist with state institutional licensure requirements (and with
224. See David Lansky, Providing Information to Consumers, in CONSUMER-
DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 419, 424-25. See generally William M.
Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health
Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999) (discussing various rationales for
disclosing health care information).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
226. See Jost, supra note 135, at 146-51.
227. See IOM, To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 6, at 3.
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private accreditation standards), which may be identical or may be
different. Providers and insurers have to comply with multiple laws
and submit to multiple inspections and audits.
Most importantly, however, our health law does not reflect any
articulated and coherent understanding of the problems that attend
our health care system, nor any coordinated set of policies that we
should pursue to try to fix them. Because of this, some problems,
like the problems of the uninsured or of medical error, are not
addressed effectively by our laws. Others, like the problem of health
care cost, are hardly addressed at all. Our laws, in sum, are largely
ineffective in dealing with the problems that plague our health care
system; they are, indeed, often counterproductive. Unfortunately,
however, the leading proposals for changes in our health law and
policy are likely to take us in the wrong direction-to make things
worse rather than better. It is to these that we now turn.
IV. PROPOSED FIXES
Though we have discussed the problems of access, cost, and
quality and the laws that address them separately, it is obvious that
proposals for health care reform must address all of these issues
together. If we had an unlimited amount of money to spend on
health care, we could, perhaps, expand access and improve quality
at the same time. But there are limits to how much we are willing
to spend on health care, and until we can control the cost of health
care we will find it very difficult to expand access. If we place
Draconian limits on cost to expand access, however, we may
threaten quality. We must try, therefore, to devise solutions that
can in fact control cost, expand access, and improve quality.
Addressing any of the three problems, and particularly all three
in tandem, will be difficult. It is essential to realize, however, that
the task is not impossible. Other countries have health care
systems that make health care products and services available to all
their citizens at a much lower cost than we do and with equivalent
quality."8  All of these systems have problems, many regard
themselves to be in crisis, but none face problems of the severity
that we face. These problems are, in sum, -not completely
intractable-we know how others have solved them. Rather, our
limitation is a lack of vision, of imagination, and of the political will
to face down the special interests that prosper under, and thus
insist on, the continuation of, the current system. Most importantly,
we lack the humility and intelligence to break free from settled
understandings about the nature of health care and of health care
228. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do?, National
Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 433, 435-37 (2004).
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markets that have been drilled into us by a media shaped by a
steady drumbeat of ideological advocacy229 and to learn from the
experience of other countries in addressing problems common to all.
A. Providing Access
The access problem, as noted above, is attributable in part to
the skewed distribution of health care costs, and in part to the
problem of affordability of health insurance. A workable solution
needs to broadly distribute both risk and cost. Employment-based
insurance has worked reasonably well in the United States for
pooling risk. It has also worked reasonably well for addressing the
cost of health insurance, as long as health care costs have borne a
reasonable relationship to wages.
The severe increases in health care costs that we have
experienced over the past three decades, however, have made our
employment-based system increasingly less viable. In the recent
past, employers have been able to keep the system afloat in large
part by shifting costs to employees through making employees bear
a larger share of premium costs and by building more cost-sharing
into insurance plans.2 30 For a time in the mid-1990s, moreover, they
were able to hold costs down effectively through managed care.22'
We are currently reaching the point, however, where the cost of
health insurance is growing so rapidly and already constitutes such
a large part of total employee compensation (at least for low and
moderate wage employees) that the viability of our employment-
based insurance system is itself threatened.
Moreover, the system has never worked very well for some
people. Small employers, who cannot offer insurers large risk pools,
have long had problems affording insurance.232 Employment-related
insurance is often not available to part-time, temporary, and
seasonal workers, even though these workers comprise a significant
share of our workforce.2"' As we have moved over the past half
century toward a workforce of two-worker families, moreover, it
229. See TRUDY LIEBERMAN, SLANTING THE STORY: THE FORCES THAT SHAPE
THE NEWS 117-48 (2000) (documenting the highly effective campaign of the
Heritage Foundation and other conservative advocacy groups to shape media
presentation of health care issues).
230. See Gabel et al., supra note 25, at 202-03.
231. See Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance is Failing:
Now What?, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, May 28, 2003, at W3-237, W3-237,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.237vl.
232. See Gabel et al., supra note 25, at 206-07.
233. Id. at 207; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKERS:
INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OFREST OF WORKFORCE 10-22 (2000),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00076.pdf.
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would appear that some businesses--indeed whole industries-
have tended to free-ride on other businesses that have offered family
policies to their workers.234
While employment-related insurance has worked reasonably
well, the best risk spreader is the government, which can include
the entire national population in one risk pool. Most developed
countries achieve broad spreading of risk either through social
insurance programs, funded through wage-based premiums
(essentially payroll taxes), or through national health insurance
programs financed through general revenue funds.235  As an
increasing share of national income is being directed in most
developed countries toward capital in the form of profits, dividends,
or interest, rather than toward labor in the form of wages, broad-
based taxes not limited to wages alone have begun to make more
sense for spreading the cost broadly.
21 6
Even those who are ideologically opposed to government finance
of health care recognize that government, will have to help those who
do not have enough income or resources to afford health care.2"7
Commentators who are committed to private finance of health care,
however, have argued that this should be done by providing tax
credits to individuals, who would then use these credits to purchase
insurance in the individual health insurance market.238 This is, for
234. Seventy-two percent of small employers who do not offer health
insurance give as an important reason for their not doing so that their
employees are covered elsewhere. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY 39 (2004), http://www.kff.org/insurance/
7148/index.cfm. Only sixty-two percent of workers in retail sales are offered
health insurance and only seventy-seven percent of those take it up, resulting
in a forty-seven percent coverage rate. By contrast, ninety-one percent of
workers in manufacturing are offered health insurance and eighty-seven
percent take it up, resulting in a eighty percent coverage rate, while ninety
percent of workers in state and local government are offered insurance and
ninety-four percent take it up, resulting in a eighty-four percent coverage rate.
Id. at 49.
235. See Jost, supra note 228, at 433-35.
236. See JOST, supra note 34, at 256.
237. See Mark V. Pauly, Conflict and Compromise Over Tradeoffs in
Universal Health Insurance Plans, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 465, 470 (2004).
238. For a small sampling of recent proposals for tax credits, see Stuart M.
Butler, Reforming the Tax 'Treatment of Health Care to Achieve Universal
Coverage, in COVERING AMERICA: REAL REMEDIES FOR THE UNINSURED 23 (Elliot
K. Wicks ed., 2001), available at http://www.esresearch.org/RWJllPDF/full-
document.pdf; Lynn Etheredge, A Flexible Benefits Tax Credit for Health
Insurance and More, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXcLUSIVE, Mar. 22, 2001, at W1,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.wl.lvl; Lawrence Zelenak, A
Health Insurance Tax Credit for Uninsured Workers, 38 INQUIRY 106, 107-08
(2001); see also Jost, supra note 33, at 420-21 (describing proposals from various
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1 • • . .. 239example, the position of the Bush administration.
Tax credit advocates generally recognize that a traditional tax
credit-an amount subtracted from tax liability at the time taxes
are paid-would do little to make health insurance affordable. Tax
credits have to be available in advance on a monthly basis at the
time premiums are due.240  They also have to be refundable;
available whether or not taxes are actually owed, as forty-five
percent of the uninsured are too poor to actually have income tax
liabilities. 24' Tax credits are essentially vouchers made available by
the government to individuals to pay for private health insurance.
To really work, moreover, tax credits have to be quite large.
The $1000 credits proposed by George W. Bush as a presidential
candidate, for example, might help to make health insurance more
affordable to higher-income uninsureds, but would not bring it
within the reach of many lower-income uninsureds.242 One analysis
concluded that the proposal President Bush made during the 2004
campaign would. have only reduced the number of uninsured by 1.8
million (though his more recent proposals are more generous).243
sources that all rely on the current system of private insurance); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE: PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDING PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC COVERAGE 6-9 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d01481t.pdf (proposing additional tax incentives to encourage
purchase of private health insurance). See generally EMPOWERING HEALTH CARE
CONSUMERS THROUGH TAX REFORM (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., 1999).
239. See Press Release, The White House, Making Health Care More
Affordable (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/
print/20040902.html.
240. JOST, supra note 34, at 194. This will require reconciliation at year's
end, which will be difficult because the income of many uninsured persons is
continually in flux. It might also require repayments for those who receive
credits that ultimately exceed their entitlement, which will be difficult for low-
income uninsureds. Id.
241. Jonathan Gruber & Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance:
Costs and Benefits, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 72, 74.
242. See FAMILIES USA, A 10-FOOT ROPE FOR A 40-FOOT HOLE: TAX CREDITS
FOR THE UNINSURED, 2004 UPDATE, at 3-5 (2004), available at
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/10_Foot_Rope-update-2004804d.pdf.
243. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COVERAGE AND COST IMPACTS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S HEALTH INSURANCE TAX CREDIT AND TAX DEDUCTION PROPOSALS 4
(2004), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Coverage-and-Cost-Impacts-of-the-
President-s-Health-Insurance-Tax-Credit-and-Tax-Deduction-Proposals.pdf.
While 3.1 million uninsured would gain individual insurance under the
program, 1.3 million would lose employment-related coverage, and thus become
uninsured. Id. President Bush has recently offered an increased tax credit of
$1000 for a HSA and $2000 for an insurance policy for families earning under
$25,000 a year. See Press Release, supra note 239. This would obviously cover
many more of the uninsured, but would still require families headed by a
person aged forty-five or older to spend, on average, $3,865 per year to purchase
576 [Vol. 41
OUR BROKEN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Credits would also have to be risk., adjusted.244 Because of the
skewed nature of health risks, insurers selling policies in the
individual market have to charge higher rates to, or refuse to insure,
older persons or persons with chronic diseases. This problem can be
addressed by risk-adjusted tax credits, but risk adjusting is still a
fairly primitive technology,245 and unless we simply agree to pay
whatever price insurers decide to charge it is likely that some
uninsured persons will experience a much bigger gap between their
credit and the cost of insurance than others. Alternatively, one can
require all insurers to community rate, but the problems with this
approach have already been explored.2 46
Most tax credit advocates assume that credits will be spent to
purchase health insurance in the individual market. Though
individual insurance policies often cost less than group policies, they
are cheaper only because they offer fewer benefits and require
higher cost-sharing.2 47 .Administrative costs, including marketing,
underwriting, and risk premiums, are much higher for individual
policies than for large group, or even small group, policies, and thus
the policies offer less value for money.248 Though the significantly
expanded market for individual insurance that could be created by
tax credits might bring down administrative costs, the nature of the
individual insurance market makes it unlikely that it will ever be as
efficient as group markets or direct government provision of
insurance.
The enlarged market for individual insurance would, of course,
have to be regulated. Government regulators would have to make
sure that insurers were adequately capitalized, maintained
appropriate reserves, were truthful and transparent in their
marketing practices, and were honest and expeditious in their
claims practices. To make markets for individual insurance function
properly, moreover, someone would need to collect and disseminate
high-deductible, high cost-sharing, low-benefit, policies in the non-group
market. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 41, at 5.
244. See David B. Kendall, A. Health Insurance Tax Credit, in CONSUMER-
DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 749, 757-58.
245. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE
CONUNDRUM 169 (2002); Joseph P. Newhouse, Patients at Risk: Health Reform
and Risk Adjustment, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 132, 132.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
247. KAISERFAMILY FOUND., supra note 41, at 5.
248. Administrative loads can equal thirty percent to forty percent for
individual policies. See Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance
Regulation, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 173, 175; Mark V. Pauly & Allison
M. Percy, Cost and Performance: A Comparison of Individual and Group Health
Insurance Markets, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 9, 18-20 (2000).
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information on the alternative policies available.249  Individual
markets would also work better if standard policies were available,
so that true comparative shopping would be possible. Experience
with Medicare supplement policies, for example, indicated that the
sale of individual policies in unregulated markets led to consumer
confusion, and sometimes to fraud.""
One has to wonder, however, what is achieved-other than
enriching those who sell insurance-if the government pays for
insurance in a heavily regulated market with high regulatory costs
and high private transaction costs rather than simply paying for
health care.25 ' It seems like the worst of all possible worlds, and one
has to be an awfully strong believer in the innate and inevitable
superiority of markets to believe that it is worth the effort.252
Indeed, the experiences of other countries that have tried something
like it-Chile, for example-does not inspire confidence.2 5
Alternatively, governments can provide health insurance
through public social insurance or national health service programs.
This approach provides for the broadest possible sharing of risk and
cost, and assures coverage to all. Government financing of health
care does not necessarily bring with it government provision of
health care. In fact, in most countries with public insurance
programs, primary care is privately provided, and in many countries
private, religious, nonprofit or for-profit hospitals continue to coexist
with public facilities, much as they do in the United States. 254 In a
249. The realization that health insurance markets need to be structured is
one of the contributions of Alain Enthoven. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven, Market
Forces and Efficient Health Care Systems, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 25,
27.
250. Medigap policies were eventually standardized. Adam Atherly,
Supplemental Insurance: Medicare's Accidental Stepchild, 58 MED. CARE RES. &
REV. 131, 138-42 (2001).
251. See Jost, supra note 33, at 483-91.
252. Alternatively, one can explain the interest in tax credits as an example
of public choice economics: insurers stand to make a great deal of money from a
tax credit program and thus have a strong incentive to convince Congress to
adopt one. See Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Health Reform: Why Do
Bad Things Happen to Good Plans?, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Aug. 27,
2003, at W3-391, W3-392-93, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprintlhlthaff.
w3.391vl.pdf.
253. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care Regulation: Can We Learn
from Others? The Chilean Experience, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 863 (1999).
254. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL RESEARCH, WORKING
PAPER: HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN THE EU: A COMPARATrVE STUDY (1998),
reprinted in FURROW ET AL., supra note 161, at 509-13. In Germany, for
example, fifty-four percent of hospital beds were in public hospitals, thirty-eight
percent in private nonprofit hospitals, and eight percent in for-profit hospitals
in 2002. REINHARD BUSSE & ANNETTE RIESBERG, EUROPEAN HEALTH CARE
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number of countries with social insurance programs, indeed, public
insurance is administered by private, nonprofit entities.2 5
We know that public health insurance is feasible, because most
of the countries in the world use it. Indeed, our own largest
insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid, are public programs
and provide insurance coverage to very high-cost populations at a
cost that compares very favorably with the private sector.2 56 Public
insurance is not, of course, without its own problems. Most of these
relate to the strategies that public programs use to control costs,
and are discussed in the next section. Public systems are open to
political manipulation, as is evidenced by the difficulty that
Medicare has faced in getting a competitive-bidding project
underway.2 57 Public programs also often lack the flexibility and
adaptiveness found in some private health insurance programs,
since they must usually operate through open and accountable
processes that make rapid and dramatic change difficult.2 58 Public
programs are necessarily controlled by bureaucracies, and can thus
be afflicted by the inefficiencies and corruption that plague
bureaucracies. Finally, public programs are subject to the same
problems of moral hazard that afflict private insurers; indeed, they
may be subject to a greater risk of moral hazard if individuals are
less sensitive to spending public money.
While these problems are serious, they are not insurmountable.
Obviously countries throughout the world have managed these
problems with greater or lesser success. How well they are
managed depends on many factors, including the culture of public
service within particular countries, the way in which benefits are
structured (the extent of cost-sharing, for example), and the way in
which providers relate to the government. Attention needs to be
paid to these issues and others, therefore, in determining what role
public insurance should play in a health care system.
B. Controlling Cost
The solution to the problem of health care cost control is simple.
OBSERVATORY, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION: GERMANY 56 (2004),
available at http://www.euro. who.int/Document/E85472.pdf.
255. See id. at 35 (Germany).
256. See generally MARILYN MOON, BENEATH THE AvERAGES: AN ANALYSIS OF
MEDICARE AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURES (1999).
257. See Barbara S. Cooper & Bruce C. Vladeck, Bringing Competitive
Pricing to Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 49, 51.
258. This is one of the reasons that Medicare has relied on private
accreditation programs to regulate providers. See Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of
the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS, supra note 217, at 17, 30.
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All we need to do is eliminate the provision of unnecessary health
care, control or bring down the prices of health care products and
services, and finance and deliver products and services in the most
efficient way possible to minimize administrative costs. The
difficulty is figuring out how to do this.
Three solutions have been most frequently mooted. Two of
them rely on competition and one on regulation. Those who believe
that the health care cost dragon can best be slain through
competition advocate the creation of competitive markets either for
the sale of health insurance or for the sale of health care. That is,
they believe that competition is most effective either at the point of
time when consumers purchase health insurance or at the point in
time when they purchase health care. Regulatory strategies try to
control the provision of health care by limiting supply through
budgets, health planning, or utilization controls, and controlling
prices either through price setting or through negotiation of prices.
Strategies that rely on managed competition for the sale of
health insurance were popular throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
The theory of managed competition was first articulated by Stanford
economist Alain Enthoven," but a form of it has long existed in the
Federal Employees Health Benefit Program and the California
Public Employees Retirement SyStem.2 60  The theory was the
foundation of the Clinton health plan 261 and underlies the current
Medicare Advantage program and the soon-to-be implemented
Medicare prescription drug program.
Managed competition attempts to get private health plans to
compete with each other in a managed market to provide insurance
and care management to individuals.2 6 ' Health plans are required to
259. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO
THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980); Alain Enthoven & Richard
Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health
Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy (First of Two
Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29 (1989) [hereinafter Enthoven & Kronick, First
of Two Parts]; Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health
Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote
Quality and Economy (Second of Two Parts), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 94(1989).
260. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAvE, NAT'L CTR. FOR POL'Y
ANALYSIS, A PRIMER ON MANAGED COMPETITION: WHAT IS MANAGED
COMPETITION? (1994), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st183/st183.pdf.
261. See Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton
Plan, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 66, 69.
262. The market is managed by "sponsors," such as purchasing cooperatives,
which set rules to govern competition, select participating providers, and
manage risk selection by, for example, adjusting premiums for risk and manage
enrollment. Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed
Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 25, 29-35.
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263
sell comparable products for which each sets its own price.
Individual purchasers (whose purchases are often financed in part
by employers or by government programs) choose among, plans
based on price, on such quality information as is available, and on
whatever other variables purchasers might find important (for
example, a plan's coverage of providers with whom the insured
currently has a relationship or a plan's reputation for claims
handling).264 Health plans, in turn, try to control cost and utilization
through traditional managed care techniques, such as negotiated
provider price discounts, utilization review, provider networks
limited to those who practice conservatively, or financial incentives
to encourage limited utilization of health care.26" Health plans that
cannot limit their costs must charge higher prices and will lose
market share to those that are successful in holding down costs. On
the other hand, plans that stint too much on care or attract poor
quality providers will develop a bad reputation and lose out in
competition.
On its face, managed competition is an appealing theory. It
claims to rely on competition to bring down health care costs, and is
thus consistent with the general American preference for private,
market-based solutions. It brings the creativity and flexibility of
private business to bear on the problem of cost control and is less
open to political manipulation than are regulatory solutions.
Programs that have actually tried this approach have experienced
some modest success in holding down'costs.6
On the other hand, managed competition has its own problems,
many of which have become apparent in our experiences with
managed care over the past decade.267 First, managed competition
depends on consumers being able to make rational decisions
between alternative health plans at the point that they purchase
insurance, and then being willing to be bound by that decision at a
263. Id. at 31.
264. Enthoven & Kronick, First of Two Parts, supra note 259, at 32-33.
265. Id. at 35.
266. The leading example usually referred to is the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program. For two competing evaluations of the success of the
program compared to the federal Medicare program, compare STUART M.
BUTLER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF MEDICARE AND
THE FEHBP (2003), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/
wm285.cfm, with MARK MERLIS, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
HEALTH BENEFIT PROGRAM: PROGRAM DESIGN, RECENT PERFORMANCE, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICARE REFORM 15 (2003), http://www.kff.org/medicare/
6081-index.cfm.
267. Managed competition is not the same as managed care, but does rely on
managed care to actually pay providers.
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later point when the consumer becomes a patient and actually needs
health care.268 For this approach to work at all, the consumer needs
much more information at the point of purchase than is often
available. 269 Even if the consumer had, and was capable of digesting
in some useful way, all the information available at the time of
health plan purchase regarding the benefits and limitations of each
available plan, the consumer still could not know fully at that point
whether he or she will need health care in the future, exactly what
he or she will need, and whether and to what extent any particular
plan will cover that care.270 The decision to agree to a conservative
practice style may look attractive to the apparently healthy health
plan consumer at the point of purchase if accompanied by a low
price tag, but may look very different to the desperate cancer patient
nine months later who is flailing about trying to find some hopeful
medical treatment upon which to cling.
Further, though managed competition is sold as a demand-
driven cost-control strategy, at the back end where costs are actually
controlled, it depends on supply controls, just like government
health care programs. Managed competition depends on managed
care to translate the lower prices paid by consumers for health
insurance into actual reductions in health care costs. That is, as the
Supreme Court noted in the Pegram case, managed care depends on
rationing.27' The backlash that occurred once patients (and
providers) became fully aware of this fact in the late 1990s seriously
damaged the credibility and: legitimacy of managed care.272
Managed care, moreover, often depends on the most intrusive form
of supply control, utilization review, through which managed care
plan operatives second-guess the decisions of treating physicians.
Many physicians (and patients) find this form of control through
"reins" more offensive than control through budget "fences," which is
relied on by many public insurance programs. 273  Finally, the
268. M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55
STAN. L. REv. 919, 928-29 (2002); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice
Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance
Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 517-19 (2004). -
269. For a discussion of the problems involved in informing consumers, see
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health System Reform: Forward or Backward with
Quality Oversight?, 271 JAMA 1508 (1994); Korobkin, supra note 167, at 27-62;
Sage, supra note 224, at 1720-36.
270. Mariner, supra note 268, at 517-18.
271. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220-21 (2000).
272. See Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit,
47 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 365, 370-76 (2003); David Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of
Managed Care: A Predictable "Tragic Choices" Phenomenon, 47 ST. LoUIs U.
L.J. 411, 419 (2003).
273. See Kevin Grumbach & Thomas Bodenheimer, Reins or Fences:
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administrative costs of managed competition and managed care are
very high, reflecting one additional layer of administration
necessary to structure and oversee the competition among health
plans, as well as a second layer of administration within plans to
actually manage the care rationing process.
While the managed care backlash of the late 1990s, as well as
the recent lackluster experience of managed competition programs,
has taken some of the wind out of the sails driving managed
competition in the national policy agenda, its place in the hearts of
conservative health policy analysts (many of whom never believed in
it to begin with)2. 4 has been filled with "consumer-driven health
care," based on HSAs.275 Medical savings accounts ("MSAs") were
introduced onto the American health policy stage by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") of 1996,
which granted tax subsidies to MSAs on a limited and experimental
basis to see if they could live up to the promises of their
supporters."7 6 MSAs were also introduced on an experimental basis
into Medicare by the 1997 Balanced Budget Act.2 7 Despite the fact
that both experiments were a dismal failure-no one ever signed up
for a Medicare MSA and few people signed up for the HIPAA
MSAs 27 81-the supporters of MSAs extended tax benefits to a much
larger category of MSAs (rechristened "Health Savings Accounts" or
HSAs) through the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003.279
Consumer-driven health care attempts to direct competition to
the point at which health care goods and services are purchased. It
is firmly rooted in a belief that overinsurance drives health care cost
Physician's View of Cost Containment, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990, at 120, 122-
25.
274. See, e.g., CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 96-97.
275. See id. at 83-84, 96-97; Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted
Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health Care, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2004,
at 65, 73.
276. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 220 (West 2005)).
277. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
278. Too few people signed up for the HIPAA, demonstration project to allow
the GAO to conduct an evaluation. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: RESULTS FROM
SURVEYS OF INSURERS 1 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/
he99034.pdf.
279. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 223 (West 2005)).
5832006]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
inflation-that moral hazard is the key problem in health policy.280
If we simply strip away insurance, leaving the consumer to purchase
health care out of his or her own pocket, and force providers to
compete for the consumer's money at the point of need, competition
will control health care costs.
This is a true demand-based strategy. People must make
health care purchasing decisions just as they make purchasing
decisions for everything else. Indeed, they must be prepared to
trade their preferences for health care with their preferences for
everything else. If consumers are forced to do so, providers and
professionals, now having to compete seriously for the consumer
dollar, will lower their prices.2 8 ' Consumers, on the other hand, will
buy only the services they really need (or want, or can afford), thus
bringing down utilization to the correct level.282
Making consumers aware of the cost of health care is a part of
the health care cost-control strategy of many countries. Countries
with public insurance programs impose cost-sharing obligations on
consumers for at least some health care products and services to
make consumers aware of the fact that health care is not free and to
encourage them to some extent to trade health care for other
products and services. The fact that making consumers aware of
the cost of health care through cost-sharing makes consumers cut
back on their consumption of health care is well established, in
particular through the RAND experiment mentioned above.284 While
it is true, however, that the RAND experiment found that people
consume less health care when they have to pay for it (no big
surprise here), it also found that people consume less necessary
health care to the same extent as they consume less unnecessary
health care, and that poorer people with chronic diseases suffered
poorer health when faced with high cost sharing (no surprises here
either).28'
The ultimate solution to the problem of overinsurance-simply
280. See Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Tax Credits for Health
Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 125,
129.
281. They will also hopefully charge lower prices because they save on
administrative costs by not having to deal with insurers.
282. JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING
AMERICA'S HEALTH CRISIS 80 (1992).
283. See JOST, supra note 34, at 218, 246. Cost-sharing also lessens the
burden on the public purse and provides an additional source of payment for
providers, which are probably the most important reasons why countries with
public systems turn to it.
284. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 76, at 40, 338-39.
285. See id. at 208-11, 218-19, 338-40.
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outlawing health insurance-is not embraced by even those most
convinced that health insurance is the heart of the health care cost
problem.28 6 Even they understand the problem of the skewed nature
of health care costs that accounts for health insurance in the first
place. Few people can afford to pay out of pocket for a heart
transplant or for the services required to respond to the major
traumatic injuries caused by a car accident.2 8 7 Many of those
afflicted with expensive chronic diseases would also soon find
themselves unable to afford further health care.288 Since many of
these conditions are caused or aggravated by genetic or
environmental factors, it is not fair to hold these persons solely
responsible for their suffering, no matter how one may feel about
individual, as opposed to societal, responsibility in other contexts.
Bankruptcy would solve the problems of some of those faced with
enormous expenses and no insurance, but it would only deal with
already incurred costs and not assure ongoing care to the chronically
ill. Bankruptcy, moreover, only shifts the costs of care to providers,
who themselves may be financially unable to absorb the loss.28
Realizing the problems that would accompany the elimination of
health insurance, "consumer-driven health care" advocates satisfy
themselves with merely calling for the imposition of higher
deductibles. They would couple HSAs with high-deductible health
insurance policies and offer tax subsidies to cover contributions to
the HSAs (whether they come from employers or employees) as well
as for the high-deductible policies.288
This is in fact the strategy adopted by the Medicare
Modernization Act ("MMA"). 291 The MMA offers a tax exclusion to
employers and a deduction to employees for funds contributed by the
286. RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 421 (1997); GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 282, at 29; Pauly &
Goodman, supra note 280, at 128-29.
287. According to one recent estimate, heart transplants cost from $50,000
to $287,000, averaging $148,000, while liver transplants cost from $66,000 to
$367,000, averaging $235,000. CHFPatients.com, Heart Transplant: The
Straight Story, http://www.chfpatients.com/tx/transplant.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2006).
288. See Benjamin G. Druss et al., The Most Expensive Medical Conditions
in America, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 105, 106-08.
289. Health care providers already provided nearly $36 billion in
unreimbursed care tothe uninsured in 2001. IOM, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST,
supra note 142, at 52-53.
290. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 282, at 88-92.
291. NINA OWCHARENKO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:
HOW TO BROADEN HEALTH COVERAGE FOR WORKING FAMILIES (2004), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/Wm 4 81.cfm.
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employer or employee to a HSA.2 92 The HSA must, however, be
coupled with a high-deductible health insurance policy, which must
have a deductible of at least $1,050 a year for a single individual or
$2,100 a year for family coverage.293 The tax subsidies for
contributions to the HSA are limited to the lesser of the deductible
of the insurance plan, or to an absolute limit, adjusted annually for
inflation, which for 2006 is $2,700 for individual coverage and
$5,450 for family coverage.
294
Money contributed to the HSA can be spent for "qualified
medical expenses," without being subject to income tax,296 but is
subject to both income tax and to a ten percent excise tax if it is
spent for other purposes. 29 6  "Qualified medical expenses" are
broadly defined, however, to include many things not covered by
traditional health insurance, such as nonprescription drugs and
transportation or lodging while away from home to receive medical
care.297  HSA expenditures are not controlled by the kind of
utilization review or claims processing to which normal insurance
claims are subjected, but rather by very infrequent audits by IRS
auditors who have no health care expertise. It is likely, therefore,
that HSA expenditures will be limited only by the imagination, on
the one hand, and the good faith, on the other, of their owners.
Moreover, if HSA funds are not spent for health care, they can be
withdrawn for any purpose once the account holder dies, becomes
disabled, or reaches the age of sixty-five. 298 Thus HSAs, whatever
else they may be, are also another retirement or estate planning
vehicle for wealthy persons to use to shelter income from taxation.
While the availability of high-deductible insurance policies will
mitigate the problems that consumer-driven health care will cause
292. I.R.C. §H 62(a)(19), 106(d)(1), 223(a), 3231(e)(11), 3306(b)(18),
3401(a)(22) (2000). An excellent account of the law that governs HSAs and the
policy issues that they raise is found in Kaplan, supra note 147, at 548-67.
293. 88 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (II). The insurer, however, may cover preventive
medical expenses, such as the cost of screenings or vaccinations, before the
deductible is met. Id. § 223(c)(2)(C); I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725.
The policy must also limit out-of-pocket expenses to no more than $5,200 per
year for single coverage, $10,500 per year for family coverage.
§§ 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) & (II). These amounts will be indexed for inflation. Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Indexed Amounts for Health Savings
Accounts (Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2996.htm.
294. Press Release, supra note 293. Persons aged fifty-five to sixty-five may
also make an additional "catch up" contribution. § 223(b)(3)(A).
295. Id. § 223(f)(1).
296. Id. § 223(f)(2), (f)(4)(A).
297. Id. § 213(d)(1); Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-2 C.B. 559; I.R.S. Notice 2004-
1, 2004-2 C.B. 269, 272.
298. §§ 223(f)(4)(B), (C).
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for those consumers who face serious health care expenses, it will
not by any stretch of the imagination eliminate them. Persons with
chronic diseases will run through their HSAs each year at great
expense to themselves, as they will not be able to carry over money
in the HSA from year to year but will need to keep refilling it
annually.299 Once consumers reach the limits of the deductible, they
have little reason to limit their consumption of health care or to pay
attention to its price.2 00 But because of the skewed nature of health
care, most health care costs are attributable to persons who would
exceed their deductible in any given year,301 so most health care
expenses would not be any more subject to market discipline under
HSAs than they are now. The fact that high-deductible health
insurance policies, like those offered through the FEHBP, do not
cost dramatically less than standard, policies2 02  is easily
understandable given the fact that most medical costs are incurred
by those whose costs exceed the deductible. This demonstrates the
limited capacity of this strategy to actually save money.
People with low health care expenses, on the other hand, would
continue to accumulate money in their HSAs tax free to draw on
when they retire. This feature would be very attractive to persons
in high tax brackets, but would be of little value to the poor who pay
little or no income tax.30 3 This disparity also applies to the tax
299. John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill,
38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 568-69 (2005). If medical savings accounts are
offered simply as an alternative to traditional health insurance, moreover, there
is likely to be Considerable risk segmentation, with low-'risk insureds choosing
MSAs and high-risk insureds choosing traditional insurance, threatening the
affordability of the traditional insurance alternative. See Karen Davis,
Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will it Improve Health System Performance?,
39 HEALTH SERv. REs. 1219, 1224-25 (2004).
300. Indeed, persons who are reasonably certain that they will reach the
deductible limit in any given year have little reason to economize on care even
prior to reaching the limit.
301. In 1996, expenditures for most expensive ten percent of privately
insured individuals accounted for six percent of health care expenditures, and
averaged $11,319. See Berk & Monheit, supra note 29, at 15. These
expenditures would obviously be much higher today, and would far exceed the
out-of-pocket maximums of $5,250 for an individual or $10,500 for a family
permitted by the Medicare Modernization Act's HSA provisions. Press Release,
supra note 293.
302. Karen Davis, President, The Commonwealth Fund, Presentation at the
Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins.: Medicare Modernization in a Polarized Environment
Conference Proceedings & Books: High Deductible Health Plans and Health
Savings Accounts: For Better of Worse? Chart 12 (Jan. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.nasi.org/publications2763/publications_show.htm (click on link to
the author's presentation).
303. Id. at Charts 2, 17.
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subsidies for employment-related health benefits, but all employees,
regardless of income, usually get the same health insurance
coverage when employers offer health insurance; with HSAs,
however, in which the employer's contribution does not cover the
deductible, the cost of contributing to the HSA by the owner will
depend heavily on the value of the tax subsidy. Consequently, it will
be much higher for low-income than for high-income individuals. It
is also possible that HSA owners will spend their tax-subsidized
HSA funds on things like eyeglasses or over-the-counter drugs not
covered by traditional insurance.
One real advantage of HSAs is that they should lower
administrative costs, as health insurance plans will be freed from
processing many small claims. But this cost does not go away, but is
rather transferred to the HSA owner (or trustee), who must now pay
and keep track of all of the bills to justify eventually claiming
insurance coverage once the deductible is met (and to satisfy the IRS
in an audit). Since expenses that qualify for coverage from the HSA
are not necessarily the same as those that will qualify for the
deductible, qualifying for insurance coverage once the deductible is
met is bound to cause problems for many insureds. This is, of
course, always an issue for persons who must meet an insurance
deductible, but will be more of an issue with high deductible plans,
since more bills will need to be paid and documented to prove that
the higher deductible has been met.
One simulation of the effects of MSAs based on the RAND
health experiment data predicted that they would at best result in a
reduction in health care expenditures of thirteen percent if everyone
were required to switch to a high-deductible MSA, but that if people
were given a choice to switch to an MSA or to stay with a fee-for-
service or HMO plan, MSAs would probably result in either a
decrease or increase in total health care spending in the one to two
percent range.30 4 The study noted, however, that results depended
heavily on plan design. For example, if MSA owners could use MSA
funds to pay for expenses otherwise not covered by health insurance,
such as eyeglasses or nursing home care, as is currently allowed by
the IRS HSA guidelines, expenses on such services could increase by
ten to fifteen percent.3 0 5
The success of consumer-driven health care, moreover,
ultimately depends on making patients into consumers. This in
turn depends on getting consumers the information they need to
make consumption decisions. Consumers need to know when to
304. Emmett B. Keeler et al., Can Medical Savings Accounts for the
Nonelderly Reduce Health Care Costs?, 275 JAMA 1666, 1670 (1996).
305. Id.
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seek out professional help, which professionals and providers offer
the best quality care, how to find the least expensive professionals
and providers, and which products and services recommended by
treating professionals are in fact the best and offer the best value for
money. Though consumer-driven health care advocates see great
promise in the Internet to solve all of these problems, someone will
have to create the information that will go on the Internet and put it
there, and it is not clear who that someone will be. Also, people will
have to become much more Internet literate. A recent survey of
persons over sixty-five found that seventy-three percent have never
gone online.3 °7
A bigger problem is the complexity of health care decision-
making. Just try calling five doctors' offices in your town next time
you are sick and ask them how much it will cost to treat you. My
informed guess is that most will say: "We cannot know until we have
seen you, because we do not know what is wrong with you, or even
what it will take us to find out. That is why we need to see you."
Leaving aside the question of how one makes comparative
purchasing decisions while unconscious in the ambulance being
taken to an emergency department, even in less urgent
circumstances most of us would rather not be forced to make
tradeoffs between health care that might save our lives and that
new car we have been dreaming about.3 °8 Faced with an unknown,
but possibly catastrophic risk, most persons will want health care, if
they can afford it, even though with perfect information about the
actual risk they face they might forego the health care and buy the
car. Many of us would also prefer to trust physicians to decide what
referrals, prescriptions, or orders are the best for us, without having
to do extensive Internet research and in the end get out a calculator
to compare costs and benefits.
The most important question is what effect high deductible
plans will have on the health and economic well-being of consumers.
306. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 139-41; Jon B.
Christianson et al., Defined-Contribution Health Insurance Products:
Development and Prospects, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 49, 51.
307. Drew Altman, President and CEO, Kaiser Family Found., Presentation
at the Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins.: Medicare Modernization in a Polarized
Environment Conference Proceedings & Books: The MMA: On the Road to
Implementation, Chart 16 (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.
nasi.org/Publications2763/Publications_Show.htm (click on link to author's
presentation).
308. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 35-47 (1997).
309. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 477-
82, 519-22 (2002) (discussing. the importance of trust in physician decision-
making in the patient/physician relationship).
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The evidence here is decidedly mixed. One study found that persons
with high deductible health insurance plans were twice as likely as
other privately insured persons not to see a doctor for a specific
medical problem, take medicines as often as they should, or fill a
prescription given by a doctor, and significantly more likely to not
receive medical treatment or follow-up recommended by a doctor or
to take a lower dose of a prescription than a doctor recommended.310
Insured adults with high deductibles are also much more likely not
to be able to pay medical bills, be contacted by a collection agency, or
have to change their way of life to pay medical bills.31' Of course, if
an employer funds the HSA, these effects will be mitigated, but so
will any effect that the MSA might have on making health care
consumers more cost conscious.
All of this may change. Better-educated persons are already
using the Internet extensively to diagnose their own diseases and
chart their own courses of treatment.312 Marketers are also
aggressively pushing health care information-one cannot read a
magazine or turn on the television without being bombarded by
advertising for prescription drugs.31 3 Physicians and providers may
310. Davis, supra note 299, at 1222-23.
311. Id.
312. See Drew Altman, supra note 307, at Chart 18 (noting that sixty
percent of seniors who are college graduates and sixty-five percent of seniors
who earn over $50,000 a year have used the Internet, compared to eighteen
percent of seniors with a high school or less education, and fifteen percent of
seniors who earn under $20,000 a year).
313. Our experience with drug advertising has not been an unmixed
blessing, and might give us pause as to whether we want to commercialize all of
health care to this extent. Studies show that consumers on the whole value the
information the advertisements offer. See Joel S. Weissman et al., Consumers'
Reports on the Health Effects of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, HEALTH
AFF.-WEB ExcLusIVE, Feb. 26, 2003, at W3-82, W3-91-93, http://content.health
affairs.org/webexclusives/index.dtl?year=2003. However, some physicians see
more negative effects from advertising, believing that it encourages patients to
seek treatments they do not need or provides unbalanced information on drugs.
See Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient Encounters Involving
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Apr. 28, 2004, at
W4-219, W4-224, http://content.healthaffairs.org/webexclusives/index.dtl?year=
2004.
Recent experience with COX-2 inhibitors such as Vioxx, should in
particular give us pause about the merits of advertising. Driven by a massive
advertising campaign, Vioxx was sold to millions of patients who did not need
it, resulting in serious side effects to those patients. See Carolanne Dai et al.,
National Trends in Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since Market Release:
Nonselective Diffusion of a Selectively Cost-effective Innovation, 165 ARCHIVES
OF INTERNAL MED. 171, 174-76 (2005), available at http://archinte.ama-
assn.org/cgiVreprint/ 165/2/171.pdf.
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find ways to bundle their services so as to offer fixed prices for
treatments of common ailments. But, to date, empirical evidence
gives little hope that consumer-driven health care is a panacea.3"
Experience from other countries also offers little support for the
most ambitious claims of those marketing consumer-driven health
315care.
The third approach to health care cost control, relied on by most
of the rest of the world, is some sort of government oversight. In
some countries and with respect to some health care goods and
services this is accomplished through government price controls.
Some governments control the prices for which products and
services are sold in the private sector. Canada, for example, controls
pharmaceutical prices at both the federal and provincial level,316
while Switzerland sets drug prices at the federal level and
negotiates fee schedules for doctors at the cantonal level.317 Where
governments are purchasers, governments also set prices through
administered price systems. The United Kingdom, for example,
regulates the profits that drug manufacturers can make on drugs
they sell to the NHS,318 while the United States Medicare program,
as mentioned above, uses prospective payment systems to set prices
314. Davis, supra note 299, at 1227; Stephen T. Parente et al., Evaluation of
the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health Plan on Medical Care Expenditures and
Utilization, 39 HEALTH SERA. RES. 1189, 1204-06 (2004).
315. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Consumer-Driven Health Care in South Africa:
Lessons from Comparative Health Policy Studies, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 83
(2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=766905;
see also Michael D. Barr, Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore: A Critical
Inquiry, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 709, 720-22 (2001); William C. Hsiao,
Behind the Ideology and Theory: What is the Empirical Evidence for Medical
Savings Accounts, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 733, 733-34, 736 (2001); Samuel
E.D. Shortt, Medical Savings Accounts in Publicly Funded Health Care
Systems: Enthusiasm versus Evidence, 167 CANADIAN MED. ASSOC. J. 159, 160-
62 (2002), available at http://www.cmaj.caIcontent/vol167/issue2/ (click on link
to article).
316. Prescription drugs are not covered under the Canadian federal health
scheme, though drug coverage is offered by, some provinces for some
populations. The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board regulates prices for
patented drugs, but the provinces each negotiate with distributors the prices
that the pay for drugs that they cover. See Eric Nauenberg et al., A Complex
Taxonomy: Technology Assessment in Canadian Medicare, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 63, at 57, 61-63.
317. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Swiss Health System: Regulated Competition
Without Managed Care, 292 JAMA 1227, 1229 (2004).
318. Eric Nauenberg et al., A Complex Taxonomy: Technology Assessment in
Canadian Medicare, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 63, at
57, 62.
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for a whole range of goods and' services (but not for drugs)."9
Simple price regulation, however, often has only a limited effect,
since it does not necessarily control volume. Attempts to limit prices
paid to physicians by Medicare in the 1980s were undermined as the
volume of services provided by physicians steadily increased.320
While these volume increases sometimes reflected the fraudulent
provision of unnecessary services, the uncertainty that attends
much of medical practice makes it very difficult to determine when
volume increases are justified and when they are not. Most price
regulation, moreover, is keyed to fee-for-service payments, which are
in turn keyed to. complicated systems of coding. Controls can often
be evaded by code-based "payment maximization" strategies, such as
upcoding or unbundling."2' While these abuses can be to some
extent controlled through vigorous fraud and abuse enforcement,
coding is an inexact science and it is difficult to address all but the
most egregious practices through law enforcement.32 2
Programs that rely on administered prices, like Medicare,
continually face the problem of setting prices correctly. If prices are
set too high, providers are tempted to provide unnecessary care. If
prices are set too low, providers are reluctant to provide the product
or service, or are forced to shift their costs to other payers.
Continual tinkering can produce more or less satisfactory results
but requires a great deal of time and energy.
In most developed countries, therefore, governments control
costs primarily through budgets.3 23  In national health service
systems, the government decides how much it is willing to spend on
health care and that becomes the amount that is spent. The health
care budget must compete with education, defense, roads, and other
government priorities for public funds, which must be raised
through taxation at whatever levels are acceptable to the nation.3 24
Whatever funds are available are spent, often through local or
regional purchasing or provider authorities, on health care.3 2 5
319. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2000).
320. Janet B. Mitchell, Gerard Wedig & Jerry Cromwell, The Medicare
Physician Fee Freeze: What Really Happened?, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1989, at 21,
21.
321. Jost & Davies, supra note 195, at 251-52.
322. Id. at 254-65 (discussing enforcement efforts aimed at these types of
provider behavior and provider responses).
323. Jost, supra note 228, at 436-37.
324. JOST, supra note 34, at 216-17; see also Robert G. Evans, Going for the
Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind Market-Based Health Care Reform, 22
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 427, 427 (1997) (describing the economic impetus
underlying the push for competitive health plan).
325. In England, funds are currently spent by regional primary care trusts.
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Because all funds must flow through a single "pipe," the public
budget, these countries are most successful at controlling costs.326
SCountries with social .insurance systems have less control over
spending. Social health insurance funds are often managed by
quasi-public, non-profit insurers or mutualities, which have some
degree of control over their own budgets .12' Government usually sets
guidelines for premiums but does not directly control
expenditures.328 Insurance funds in turn negotiate prices with
providers, either collectively or individually.329 In the German
system, budgets for medical care are negotiated with doctors'
unions, which in turn distribute the funds among their members
based on productivity.33° In some systems the volume of services
provided by individual providers is also reviewed to control those
who would try to abuse or defraud the system.33' Though social
insurance programs are less successful than single-payer systems at
controlling costs, they still hold costs at much lower levels than does
the United States, the least disciplined of all health care systems.
Budgeting is essentially a supply constraint strategy. In the
end it gives those who produce products and services a fixed amount
of money with which they must produce health care. Though in the
first instance these funds are often allocated by government or social
insurance fund bureaucrats, in the end resources are often
"rationed" at the patient level by health care professionals who
decide how limited funds will be spent and services allocated.332 To
the extent that professionals are the people most capable of deciding
which patients need what services, this approach to allocation works
reasonably well.
Budgeting, like all other cost control approaches, is also
attended by problems. If health care budgets are too constrained, as
they have been historically in the United Kingdom and as they are
reportedly for some services in Canada, rationing can become
JOST, supra note 34, at 206-07.
326. Josep Figueras et al., Patterns and Performance in Social Health
Insurance Systems, in SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN-EUROPE
117-18 (Reinhard Busse, Josep Figueras & Richard B. Saltman eds., 2004).
327. See Reinhard Busse et al., Organization and Financing of Social Health
Insurance Systems: Current Status and Recent Policy Developments, in SOCIAL
HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE 34-40 (Reinhard Busse, Josep
Figueras & Richard B. Saltman eds., 2004).
328. Id. at 58-60.
329. Id. at 53-55.
330. JOST, supra note 34, at 243-45.
331. See id. at 252-55 (describing the German system).
332. This is often done through primary care "gate-keeping" systems. Id. at
218-20.
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embarrassingly visible.33 Waiting lists develop for some products
and services. Waiting lists, however, are a complicated1 334
phenomenon. They tend to affect certain procedures more than
others, particularly those that are non-life threatening, routine and
uninteresting.33 The same procedures-varicose veins, hernias,
painful and immobile joints, or cataracts, for example-tend to be
those with the longest wait lists in England, year after year,
indicating that waiting lists may be as much a manifestation of the
difficulty of getting physicians who are paid fixed salaries to take on
professionally unsatisfying tasks as they are of an imbalance of
supply and demand.336  In any event, countries like Germany or
France that invest more resources in health care do not have serious
problems with waiting lists.
337
Countries with government-financed health care systems also
tend to exercise more control over the introduction of health care
technology. They can, and do, use evidence-based technology
assessment to determine whether new technologies are effective, or
even cost-effective, before they decide whether or not to finance
them.338  As new technology is one of the biggest cost-drivers in
modern health care systems, this strategy has some promise for
controlling health care costs. Unfortunately, it is politically very
difficult for countries to refuse to finance new technologies. 9
Manufacturers exert considerable political pressure to advocate
adoption, often joined by professional or patient groups. 340  This
pressure is usually difficult to withstand, particularly given the
ambiguous nature of the evidence in many cases. Technology
assessment can, however, delay the entry of new technologies at
least until they have been thoroughly evaluated, and sometimes
avoid the funding of technologies that rapidly prove to be
ineffective.34' Planning can also control the dissemination of
333. See Luigi Siciliani & Jeremy Hurst, OECD, Economic Studies No. 38,
2004/1, Explaining Waiting-Time Variations for Elective Surgery across OECD
Countries, 96, 99 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/52/
35028282.pdf.
334. JOST, supra note 34, at 222-25 (exploring the complex causes of wait
lists).
335. Stephen Frankel, The Origins of Waiting Lists, in RATIONING AND
RATIONALITY IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 6 (Stephen Frankel & Robert
West eds., 1993).
336. Id. at 10-12.
337. Siciliani & Hurst, supra note 333, at 104-07.
338. See INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 63, at 260.
339. Id. at 259-62.
340. Id. at 259-60.
341. Id. at 258.
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technologies to avoid wasteful excess capacity.3 42
Each cost control strategy has its own strengths and
weaknesses, though they are not equal. An ideal health care system
would include a mix of government budgeting and price setting,
competition, and consumer participation. We will shortly turn to
describing such a system. Before leaving the area of cost-control,
however, one final issue must be dealt with. This is the red herring
of choice.
Right-wing advocacy groups often laud consumer-driven or
managed competition systems as affording "choice."3 43 It is true that
managed competition gives consumers a choice of health plans that
may not be available in a government-financed program.3 44 On the
other hand, if the government decides to "choose" one particular
form of insurance for a tax subsidy, as Congress has decided to do
with HSAs, it is not giving you a choice, it is making a choice for
you.345 Similarly, if an employer offers an employee only a choice of
a HSA/high-deductible policy, the choice has been made for the
employee.
More importantly, however, managed competition systems, and
some forms of consumer-driven health care, sharply limit a choice
that is much more important to consumers: choice of provider.346 In
fact, government-financed systems often provide the broadest choice
of provider, indeed in some countries consumers can choose virtually
any provider in the country.347 Insofar as choice is a value that is
342. See generally Jost, Dawson & den Exter, supra note 89.
343. See, e.g., SUE A. BLEVINS, THE CATO INST., RESTORING HEALTH
FREEDOM: THE CASE FOR A UNIVERSAL TAx CREDIT FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (1997),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-290.pdf (arguing that universal
tax credits will restore Americans' freedom of health care choice).
344. Many European social insurance countries do, however, offer
consumers a choice of health plans, including Germany, Switzerland, The
Netherlands, and Belgium. See Reinhard Busse et al., Organization and
Financing of Social Health Insurance Systems: Current Status and Recent
Policy Developments, in SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN
EUROPE, supra note 331, at 39.
345. I am indebted to Jeanne Lambrew for this insight.
346. This is obviously true for managed-competition systems in which
consumers must pick a particular managed-care company and stay within its
network or pay extra to go out-of-network, but is also true of consumer-driven
programs where consumers must construct, and then stay within, their own
networks or pick from a menu of benefit packages offering different networks or
where consumers must use their HSA to purchase from providers chosen by
their plan. See Jon R. Gabel, Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas Rice, Consumer-
Driven Health Plans: Are They More Than Talk Now?, HEALTH AFF.-WEB
ExcLusIvE, Nov. 20, 2002, at W-395, W-396, http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.395v1.pdf.
347. This is generally true in social insurance countries. See Reinhard
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important in itself, it may argue for social insurance systems that
maximize the choice that matters.
C. Ensuring Quality
Despite the fact that quality is the oldest health care policy
concern of the law, it remains the one that we are least able to
address. 'No one has yet designed a health care system that
consistently provides high quality care. It is far from clear,
moreover, that the mechanisms that we use for promoting or
assuring quality are very effective. There is little evidence that
malpractice litigation, for example, promotes the quality of health
care, though it is certainly arguable that there would be more
medical errors without its deterrent effect.8 48  In the institutional
setting, the threat of vicarious or corporate liability has encouraged
risk-management programs, but, again, research has not
established the effectiveness of these programs. 34 9 There is also
little evidence that peer-review-based credentialing programs,
accreditation, licensure, or quality regulation programs have been
effective, though we can point to some success stories, such as a
decline in the use of physical or chemical restraints following the
implementation of federal nursing home reform regulation.8 50
Moreover, quality improvement has sometimes become an excuse to
argue for the adoption of special interest legislation that seems to be
actually motivated by a desire to protect providers from liability and
public oversight.3•
We do have some ideas about how to improve quality.
Professionals and providers tend to be more proficient in doing what
they do most often, so a reorganization of the health delivery system
to permit the focused and integrated delivery of particular kinds of
care might help. Better coordination of the management of
Busse et al., Organization and Financing of Social Health Insurance Systems:
Current Status and Recent Policy Developments, in SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 327, at 55-58. Even in national health
services countries, however, choice of primary care physicians is often largely
unrestrained, and in some countries choice of secondary or tertiary care
providers is also open. See generally Jost, Dawson & den Exter, supra note 89.
348. See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, supra note 208, at 893; Jost, supra note 112,
at 572-76.
349. Liang & Ren, supra note 213, at 525-26.
350. See Marshall B. Kapp, Quality of Care and Quality of Life in Nursing
Facilities: What's Regulation Got to Do with It?, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 707, 718-
19 (2000).
351. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 111, at 1447.
352. CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 105-10; IOM,
QUALITY CHAsM, supra note 6, at 7.
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chronic diseases should improve treatment and, possibly, control
cost.353 Improving systems to reduce the possibility and influence of
human error is also important.354 It has often been observed that
accident rates in the airlines industry are much lower than in health
care in large part because redundant safety technology has greatly
reduced the potential damaging influence of human error.355 The
use of electronic medical records (a technology already widely
adopted in Europe) and automatic reminder systems are examples
of such technological :improvements.356 Finally,, information about
errors needs to be continually collected and strategies for addressing
error continually refined.35 7
Health care systems can also be designed to improve quality. If
consumers could be armed with better information about quality,
they could reward better quality providers with their business and
punish poor. quality providers by refusing to purchase from them.
35 8
Government purchasers or health plans can "pay for performance"
and thus encourage better quality.359 Both strategies, however, are
dependent on our being able to find simple ways of identifying high-
quality providers, and nothing in this area is simple. Providers who
have the highest mortality rates, for example, may. be those who are
taking on the highest risk patients-they may even be the most
proficient.3 60 Rewarding low mortality rates, therefore, may simply361
encourage providers to avoid taking on the most desperate cases.
Risk adjusting can help avoid this problem, but here, as elsewhere,
risk adjusting is far from an exact science. The most obvious thing
that can be said about this area is that we need to learn a lot more
about health care quality and how to produce it.
353. CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 106-07; IOM,
QuALITY CHASM, supra note 6, at 9-10.
354. Liang & Ren, supra note 213, at 522-23.
355. See Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1855 (1994)
for the origin of this observation.
356. See IOM, QUALITY CHASM, supra note 6, at 164-77; Amednews.com,
Tyler Chin, Americans Trail Much of Europe in Adopting Electronic Medical
Records, Sept. 2, 2002, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2002/09/02/bisfO
902.htm.
357. Jost, supra note 112, at 594-97; Liang & Ren, supra note 213, at 535-38.
358. See DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 14, at 17-24.
359. See sources cited supra note 111.
360. Jost, supra note 269, at 1509.
361. It may also discourage providers from caring for minority or poor
patients, who often have more complex problems and worse outcomes than
wealthier majority white patients. INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 38-79 (Brian D.
Smedley et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter IOM, UNEQUAL TREATMENT].
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V. HOW SHOULD WE SOLVE OUR ACCESS, COST,
AND QUALITY PROBLEMS?
From our discussion so far, a number of principles can be
discerned to help us design a health care system. Any health care
system that will be politically acceptable in the United States will
have to include private enterprise. But virtually all health policy
analysts, of whatever political persuasion, agree that government
involvement is necessary to make health care affordable to the
362 Aeipoor. Americans, however, have a strong preference for private
markets, and are particularly unlikely to accept government
provision of health care.36" Public opinion is indeed unlikely to
accept a total government takeover of health care finance.
Because government is the largest and most efficient risk
spreader, it should be relied upon to spread the greatest health care
risks. Government should also be used to assure that health care is
affordable to those who cannot otherwise afford it. Market
competition should, on the other hand, be used to bring down costs
and to improve quality where competition is feasible. Budgets
should also be used, however, to control costs, particularly for
government programs. While public regulation is needed to assure
quality, professional oversight should also be encouraged to assist
with quality improvement. What is needed, that is to say, is a mix
of public and private solutions.
Fortunately, we have a number of models for achieving a mix of
government- and private-risk bearing. The recently adopted
Medicare prescription drug program offers one such model.3  The
362. See, e.g., CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 182.
363. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans' Views of the Uninsured: An Era
for Hybrid Proposals, HEALTH AFF.-WEB ExcLusivE, Aug. 27, 2003, at W3-405,
W3-408-09 (observing that almost half of Americans surveyed would favor a
single-payer health insurance system, half would oppose it, and only about a
quarter would prefer it as a means of providing health care to the uninsured).
In fact, though there has been a dramatic shift toward support for market
approaches to health care among policy elites in recent years, public support for
government provision of health care in the United States has never been strong,
while public support for a government role in financing of health care, though it
has varied over the years, remains robust. Mark Schlesinger, Reprivatizing the
Public Household: Medical Care in the Context of American Public Values, 29 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 969, 974-80 (2004).
364. This program is administered by private risk-bearing prescription drug
plans which are paid based on bid premiums, but the plans only bear full risk
within specified risk corridors. The government shares the risk for costs above
these risk corridors, and the government bears most of the risk of catastrophic
payments. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 7 (Jan. 14, 2004),
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experience of other health care systems that mix public and private
insurance, such as the Dutch, German, and Australian systems, can
also assist us. 36 5 The Dutch system is of particular interest, because
it divides responsibility between public and private insurance in
part based on the nature of the risk borne.3 66
First, in a reformed health care system, as in the Dutch system
and the new Medicare drug benefit program, catastrophic risk
should be assumed by the government. Long-term skilled nursing
facility care, hospitalizations that last more than a specified period
of time (for example, ten days), inpatient mental health care, and
certain specific very expensive medical procedures (such as organ
transplants), should be financed by the government.367  This would
shift the highest risks, and those risks least likely to be bearable by
particularly vulnerable groups, to the best risk bearer, i.e., the risk
bearer with the greatest financial resources and the ability to spread
risk most broadly.368
Second, at the other end of the spectrum, cosmetic procedures
and "life-style care"369 should be financed privately, either out-of-
pocket or though a private insurance market, if one develops. Most
public and private insurance programs, not only in the United
States but also in other countries, already take this approach. They
seem to be able to distinguish between reconstructive surgery to
correct cleft palates or other abnormal disfiguring conditions on the




365. See Jost, supra note 33, at 450-63.
366. Id. at 460-63. The Dutch health care system has been restructured as
of 2006 so that most acute care is now covered through a private insurance
managed competition system, but the basic structure of the system remains as
described here. See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND ,SPORT, HEALTH
INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE NEW HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM
2006 (2005), available at http://www.europeanvoice.com/downloads/NL_New-
Health_Insurance-System.pdf.
367. This list is obviously somewhat arbitrary, but is intended to capture
events that are both high in cost and likely to be imposed on patients
particularly unable to bear the cost.
368. The federal government is the most appropriate level of government to
run such a program for a number of reasons that I have fully explored
elsewhere. JOST, supra note 34, at 172-78. Among other reasons, a federal
program avoids the "race to the bottom" that can occur with state programs,
and the federal government is much better able than the states to marshal
revenues to fund countercyclical programs. Federal law-i.e., ERISA and tax
subsidy law-has already largely displaced state law in the private health
insurance sector, and it makes sense that it govern the public sector as well.
369. Such as drugs for addressing erectile dysfunction or toenail fungus.
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enlargement or wrinkle removal to improve normal appearance on
the other, which are not covered. 37 '
Third, low-cost, predictable items and services should remain
the private responsibility of all but the poorest individuals.
Eyeglasses, routine dental care, over-the-counter drugs, and routine
primary care (up to four visits a year), for example, are relatively
predictable and affordable. There is little reason to incur the
additional costs of billing and claims processing when routine, low-
cost, products and procedures are involved.3"' It is much like paying
for an insurance plan to cover oil changes or replacement tires. This
is not to say that insurance for these items and services should be
illegal. It should just not be required or tax-subsidized.
An exception would have to be made to this principle, however,
for persons with very low incomes, for whom even these expenses
should be covered, as they are now by the Medicaid program in most
states. For those under 135% of the poverty level, a government
program should cover these costs.372 The program should also cover
these costs for those with incomes between 135% and 200% of the
poverty level, though these beneficiaries should share the cost by
bearing some cost-sharing obligations.3 73 People with this little
income would be unduly burdened by the cost of these basic services,
and there is little to be gained by causing them to forego basic
primary dental or medical care, which might cause them to require
more expensive care later, or which might make it difficult for them1 , 371
to participate in the workforce.
370. See AM. SOC'Y OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, INSURANCE COVERAGE: A PATIENT'S
GUIDE, available at http://www.plasticsurgery.org/public_education/procedures/
insurance_coverage.cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
371. There is, of course, the risk that consumers will fail to purchase
medically necessary services, necessitating higher costs later if conditions
deteriorate. This risk is considerably lessened under this proposal, however,
because preventive services are covered by a separate program.
372. In 2006, this would equal $12,920 for a single individual, $17,321 for a
couple. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET: LOW-INCOME
ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT, http://www.kff.org/medicare/
upload/Low-Income-Assistance-Under-the-Medicare-Drug-Benefit-Fact-
Sheet.pdf. The Medicare prescription drug legislation does not require
premium payments for individuals whose incomes fall below this level. Id.
373. Two hundred percent of the poverty level is the income eligibility level
for most State Children's Health Insurance programs. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, SCHOOL MEALS, THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH
INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP) (2001), available at http://www.fns.usda.
gov/cnd/SCHIP/factsheet.htm. States that chose to provide coverage at higher
levels would be allowed to do so. Id.
374. It would be necessary to develop some simple means of determining
who was eligible for these subsidies, for example, using income tax filings. Also,
a creative and aggressive outreach program would be needed to assure that
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Fourth, a basic set of preventive services should be available to
all regardless of ability to pay, financed by a public program. This
should include immunizations, preventive screenings, well-baby
physicals, prenatal care, and periodic physicals for older people.375
Such services are already covered by Medicare and for low-income
children through the Medicaid EPSDT program.376  Preventive
services may also be covered without regard to the deductible by
insurers that provide high-deductible policies coupled with HSAs
under the new federal law."' This. provision would merely spread
this government assistance to the rest of the population.
That leaves everything else-most acute care, most care for the
management of chronic conditions that do not result in long-term
care or hospitalization, prescription drugs, durable medical
equipment, and various therapies. These products and services
would be covered by insurance. Everyone would be required by law
to carry this insurance, just as all but three states now require
378
everyone who owns a car to carry liability insurance. Just as car
owners cannot shift the cost of accidents to their victims by refusing
to carry liability insurance, persons who can afford health insurance
should not be able to shift the cost of medical care they might need
to society by refusing to carry health insurance. Employers could
continue to self-insure or purchase insurance for their employees.
Individuals or families could also buy insurance in the non-group
insurance market. Insurers, however, would be required to accept
all applicants and to community rate, which would save
underwriting costs. Because such insurance would no longer need to
cover catastrophic costs, and because it would also not have to cover
low-cost but widely used routine services, it would be much less
expensive. The risks that it covered would also be much more
predictable, greatly reducing the threat to insurers posed by adverse
selection (and reducing the cost of the insurance). The federal
government should offer its own insurance plan, which would
compete with employer-provided and individual insurance. It would
be run by an independent federal corporation, and would be largely
those eligible for the program would actually be signed up.
375. These services could be provided through local health departments, as
some already are, or by private physicians who could be paid to provide them.
376. See Medicare.gov, Preventive Services, http://www.medicare.gov/
Health/Overview.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2006); U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Serv., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., EPSDT Benefits, http:H/
www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEarlyPeriodicScrn/02-Benefits.asp#TopOfPage (last
visited Apr. 6, 2006).
377. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(C) (2000). See I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725.
378. See Ins. Info. Inst., Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws, http://
www.iii.org/individuals/auto/a/stateautolaws/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
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self-financing from premiums. 9
Each plan would be required to cover all necessary and non-
experimental health care that did not fall into the four categories of
care already discussed.3  Private plans could, however, offer
additional coverage, for example, life-style treatments or low-cost
and predictable services.
Data would be collected on the risk distribution between various
plans. If, as is likely, the government plan ended up with a worse
risk distribution than the other plans, it would be subsidized from
tax revenues as necessary to compensate for this adverse risk
selection and bring the cost of the government plan to the average
cost of a private plan.381 Individuals who wanted a richer benefit
package, however, could pay more for a private plan, while those
who were willing to live with more constrained provider networks
could also choose cheaper private plans, if any were offered."
While this approach to insurance would make sure everyone
was insured, steps would still need to be taken to assure that this
insurance was affordable to all. Everyone whose income fell below
135% of the poverty level would receive a voucher from the federal
government equal to the cost of the government insurance plan.
Those whose incomes were between 135% and 300% of poverty
would receive a voucher of diminishing value, designed to make sure
that no one would need to pay more than ten percent of their income
for health care.383 Finally, those persons who would have otherwise
379. An alternative suggested by Professor David Super would be to create
two federal insurance companies that would compete with each other, just as
we have two government-sponsored enterprises in the secondary home
mortgage market, the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Until recently the largest "private insurer"
in Australia--Medibank Private-was a government sponsored insurer,
created to make certain that a private insurer was available in markets
otherwise not served by private insurance. See JOST, supra note 34, at 454.
380. These four categories are catastrophic (covered by public insurance),
cosmetic or life-style (not covered), low-cost and predictable (not covered, except
for the poor), and preventive (covered for all).
381. It would be important, however, not to provide subsidies for the
government plan other than those necessary to compensate for risk adjustment,
to make sure that it competed with private plans on a fair basis.
382. It would also be possible to create a broader risk-pooling scheme to
discourage risk selection on the part of all of the participating plans, as is done
in Australia. See Jost, supra note 33, at 458-59. Given, however, the fact that
most risk will be borne by the government catastrophic care scheme, this should
not be necessary.
383. Note that since catastrophic costs were excluded, policies would cost
much less than they do now. Ten percent of income is usually considered an
upper limit for out-of-pocket medical spending for insured persons before they
are considered "underinsured." See HEALTH POL'Y ANALYSIS PROGRAM, UNIV. OF
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been eligible for Medicare would be covered by the government
program (unless they opted for a private plan), but would need to
pay what they would otherwise have paid for Part B premiums.
Finally, cost-sharing should be used where appropriate to
ensure that consumers are made sensitive to health care costs where
this makes sense. Tiered pharmaceutical plans, for example, that
make the insured pay more for non-generic drugs or for
therapeutically equivalent brand-name drugs whose manufacturers
refuse to offer discounts to insurers, have shown success in
controlling health care costs without adverse health consequences,
and could continue under the new plan.3 s Minimal copayments for
physician visits, perhaps in the ten- to fifteen-dollar range, might be
appropriate to discourage excessive use. Even higher copayments
might be useful for emergency room visits to discourage the use of
the emergency room for primary care. These copayments should be
waived or reduced, however, for persons who qualify for assistance
for routine medical costs because of their income to make sure that
these people are able to afford the care that they need.
Cost-sharing should not be imposed in situations where it is
inappropriate to create an economic disincentive for the use of care.
The patient is rarely the decision maker with respect to hospital
care, for example, and, therefore, a financial disincentive is
inappropriate. 85 Where a patient is receiving either generic or,
where necessary, a preferred brand-name pharmaceutical to
manage a chronic disease, financial disincentives are inappropriate
because we do not want to discourage care where lack of that care
may seriously threaten health or increase costs later. One approach
might be, therefore, to cap total cost-sharing obligations, as is done
in a number of other countries,386 but it also might be appropriate to
WASH. SCH. OF PuB. HEALTH, INFO. UPDATE 1 (2004), available at http://depts.
washington.edu/hpap/pdf_reports/cost of underinsurance-summary.pdf. This
figure is also a good benchmark for defining the maximum a family should have
to spend on cost sharing and insurance premiums.
384. See Brenda Motheral & Kathleen A. Fairman, Effect of a Three-Tier
Prescription Copay on Pharmaceutical and Other Medical Utilization, 39 MED.
CARE 1293, 1299 (2001).
385. A possible exception here would be where a procedure can be performed
equally well and safely on an outpatient or inpatient basis, in which case
financial incentives might be appropriate to encourage the patient to use the
less expensive approach. The RAND study did find that cost-sharing reduced
hospitalization, but also found that it reduced appropriate hospitalizations to
the same extent as inappropriate, suggesting that a better tool needs to be
found to encourage appropriate use of hospital care. See NEWHOUSE, supra
note 76, at 172-76.
386. See BUSSE & RIESBERG, supra note 254, at 75-77 (describing exemption
in Germany).
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exclude certain maintenance drugs from cost-sharing.
The approach described above would in fact assure that all
Americans had health insurance. It would accomplish this by
addressing both the problems of risk and of affordability, and by
doing so while still preserving a role for private initiative and for
consumer responsibility. It would also have great promise for
controlling costs.
The government catastrophic care program would be dealing
primarily with institutional providers, which it could pay on an
administered price basis, as they are paid now by Medicare and
Medicaid. Alternatively, it could negotiate budgets with providers,
as payers do in the German system,38 7 or purchase blocks of services
from providers who provide care most efficiently or who provide the
highest quality care.38' The government preventive care program
could also negotiate prices, perhaps through a competitive bidding
process. Vaccines and screening tests, for example, could be bought
in quantity from the lowest bidder or from the provider who
provided the highest quality services. The government acute care
insurance company would probably pay for services on an
administered price basis, as Medicare now does. Private providers
would not be required to participate in the public program, however,
and prices would have to be set at a high enough level to assure
provider participation.
The proposal does not simply rely on the government to control
costs, however, but also takes advantage of both managed
competition and consumer-driven purchasing strategies. The
government program would be competing for business with private
insurers, and if it set the prices it paid providers too high, or was
unable to control fraud and abuse, it would have to raise premiums
and would lose members to the private plans. Alternatively, if the
government program set the prices it paid providers too low, and
was unable to attract high quality providers, it would also lose
market share to private insurers.8 89 If, as I predict, it was able to
underprice private insurers, it would set an example for the private
sector to follow. Competition between the public and private
387. See Jost, supra note 33, at 243-48.
388. In the English National Health Care Service, local purchasing
authorities, called primary care trusts, negotiate contracts with providers for
the purchase of services for their residents. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost et al.,
The British Health Care Reforms, The American Health Care Revolution, and
Purchaser/Provider Contracts, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 885, 887 (1995).
389. If there were two competing government insurers, the performance of
the more successful might set a benchmark for and call attention to the
underperformance of the other.
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insurance programs would keep the prices of both programs in
check.
The private insurers could develop provider networks to save
cost or encourage quality. Both private and public insurers,
however, would cover the same menu of services, and each would be
subject to prompt internal and external review if it refused to cover
services.390 New products and services, as well as questionable
existing products and services, would be subject to rigorous
technology assessment.391 Products and services found ineffective, or
to be seriously inferior in terms of cost-effectiveness, would not be
covered by the public program. Private programs could cover them,
but this would be reflected in higher premiums.
The products and services that consumers are able to, in fact,
judge comparatively and that are affordable to most consumers,
such as eyeglasses, contact lenses, routine dental care, and some
primary medical care, would be purchased directly by consumers.
Optometrists, opticians, and purveyors of over-the-counter drugs
already advertise their prices, and dentists and primary care
physicians would follow suit.19 2  All professionals and providers
would be required to list their prices on a publicly provided Internet
site for a set list of routine services that are the private
responsibility of patients to allow easy price comparison shopping.
3 93
As insurers would pay no more for professional services than these
published prices,394 competition for direct patient purchasing might
also bring down insurance prices as well (though it is likely that
insurers would continue to be able to get better prices from
providers than private individuals because they can offer volume).
Competition among health care professionals would begin to look
more like current competition among lawyers for providing routine
services, such as bankruptcies, divorces, or real estate closings.
390. See Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding
Legal Remedies to Achieve Managed Care Accountability, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L.
233, 237-75 (2004) (reviewing current state of managed care external review
statutes).
391. See Symposium, Putting Evidence into Practice, HEALTH AFF., Jan/Feb.
2005, at 7 (discussing the state of evidence-based technology assessment in the
United States). See generally INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note
63 (discussing international experience with the use of technology assessment
for coverage determinations).
392. The Supreme Court's decision in California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526
U.S. 756, 778 (1999), unfortunately gives private professional associations
considerable discretion in limiting professional advertising.
393. Since laboratory tests and diagnostic imaging would be covered by
insurance, professionals would only need to set and publish prices for their
consultation services.
394. They could, of course, negotiate lower prices.
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To the extent that cost control is effective, it will make a
number of powerful interests very unhappy. One person's cost is
another's income or profit. If health care cost containment were
ever successfully implemented in the United States, doctors,
hospitals, health insurers, and drug companies can be counted on to
whine about their loss of income and about the threat that this
would pose to the nation's health.39 5 But in other countries, health
care professionals earn far less than they do in the United States
when compared to the income of the average worker, and somehow
manage to get by.196 There is no reason why health care providers,
as opposed to other providers of goods and services, should be
entitled to income protection not extended to others in the economy.
Actually limiting growth in health care costs, moreover, would
likely have an impact on the nation's economy. Health care is one of
the few things that is still predominantly produced domestically in
the United States, and growth in the health care sector has been one
of the primary drivers of job creation in our country.3 97 Imposing
serious constraints on the growth of health care would likely take a
toll on job growth. But, because we pay excessively high prices for
health care, controlling those, prices could allow us to move
investment to sectors of the economy where that money could be
used more productively. And cutting the costs paid by employers for
health insurance would be likely to promote job growth elsewhere in
the economy. In any event, we should not allow health care to
consume an ever-greater share of our national income unless we
actually prefer to spend money on it rather than on other goods and
services.399 The plan proposed here would allow us both to make
395. See Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression, and Shear: Directions,
Stresses, and Outcomes of Health Care Cost Control, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 101, 117 (1990).
396. Physician incomes are much higher in the United States than they are
in other OECD countries. In 1996, for example, the average U.S. physician
income was $199,000, while the OECD median physician income was $70,324.
The ratio of the average income of U.S. physicians to average employee
compensation for the United States as a whole was about 5.5, compared to
Germany at 3.4, Canada at 3.2, Switzerland at 2.1, France at 1.9, and the
United Kingdom at 1.4. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Gerard F.
Anderson, Cross-National Comparisons of Health Systems Using OECD Data,
1999, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2002, at 169, 175.
397. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, identifies the "education
and health services industry" as the industry sector that will experience the
fastest growth in employment from 2004 to 2014, while six of the "ten fastest
growing occupations" it identifies for 2004-2014 are health care occupations.
See BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., ECON. AND EMP. PROJECTIONS, 5 tbl.1, 7 tbl.3c (2005),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf.
398. See Mark V. Pauly, Should We Be Worried About High Real Medical
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political decisions as to how much we want to spend as a nation and
personal decisions as to how much we want to spend as individuals
on health care.
To facilitate that political choice, and also to assure that the
costs of health care are borne broadly and progressively, the cost of
the government programs should be financed through a broad-based
tax such as the income tax, rather than by a narrow and regressive
payroll tax.399 The tax, however, should be earmarked for health
care (as the Medicare tax is now), possibly through a percentage
surcharge on income tax, to make the health care spending visible
and transparent. Polls show that Americans support the
government spending more money if necessary to make high-quality
care available to all; many even support substantial tax increases
for this purpose."' It should be possible, therefore, to raise enough
money in this way to fund the program.
The proposed program could also be structured to address our
problems of quality of care and medical error. Current licensing,
accreditation, certification, institutional regulation, and drug and
device approval and monitoring programs should continue in place,
and be continually improved, until better means of assuring
institutional competence are discovered. Both public and private
insurers should be encouraged to experiment with pay-for-
performance approaches to provider payment. Maintaining a
diversity of payers for most services should facilitate
experimentation in this area. The creation of information that
might permit competition on the basis of quality should be
encouraged to allow comparative shopping for services, and reliable
comparative information on quality, as it emerges, should be made
available on the Internet sites where providers post price
information. This competition should encourage providers to
specialize and to become better at doing what they do best. On the
other hand, a national and uniform system of health insurance
should be used to facilitate the adoption of electronic patient records
and reminder systems. Most importantly, the federal government
should devote significant funding toward identifying the best clinical
practices and should publish information developed through this
funding on internet sites to which the public and all providers have
access.
Finally, a thoroughgoing reform of the health care system could
Spending Growth in the United States?, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Jan. 8,
2003, at W3-315, W3-318, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.
w3.15v1.pdf.
399. JOST, supra note 34, at 272.
400. Blendon et al., supra note 363, at W3-410.
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open the door for real malpractice reform that goes beyond efforts to
disadvantage malpractice plaintiffs and punish plaintiffs attorneys.
If the government was responsible for catastrophic medical
expenses-caring for brain-damaged children, for example-there
would be much less need to litigate responsibility for the damage.4"1
If the government was the primary source of payment for hospitals,
nursing homes, and some specialists, the government could take
responsibility for providing affordable malpractice insurance.
4 0 2
National legislation could set up a workers' compensation type
system to compensate injury, increasing the availability of payment
for smaller medical negligence claims. The entity administering the
claims could use information gained through the compensation
program to identify and devise responses to underlying problems
that result in medical errors. In some instances, this might lead to
taking corrective action against providers. In others, problems in
larger systems could be identified, and appropriate responses could
be devised. Because the government would be paying for the
majority of health care in the new system, it would have even more
of an incentive than it now has to assure that it was getting its
money's worth in terms of quality from the system.
VI. THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE NEW SYSTEM
Most of the statutory and regulatory law necessary to
implement this new system would have to be federal law. Our
experience with Medicaid should have taught us that there is little
to be gained by creating fifty different programs to deal with what is
essentially a national problem.4"3 Diseases and accidents are the
same in every state, and the services and products necessary to
treat them do not change when one crosses state lines.4"4 Federally
subsidized state health care programs, like Medicaid, lead to
401. In Germany, for example, damages in medical negligence litigation are
much lower than in the United States because medical costs are largely covered
by insurance. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Schlichtungsstellen and
Gutachterkommissionen: The German Approach to Extrajudicial Malpractice
Claims Resolution, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 81, 102 (1996).
402. See William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 10, 20
(recommending that Medicare take the lead in resolving the malpractice
insurance crisis).
403. See JOST, supra note 34, at 172-78.
404. There is, of course, considerable variation as to how medical conditions
are treated in different regions of the country. See THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF
HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1999, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM (John E. Wennberg et al.
eds., 1999), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/99Atlas.pdf.
This variation, however, is generally viewed as a problem rather than a virtue.
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undesirable gaming of the system by the states to capture federal405
money, and create the risk that a person's health coverage could
change significantly just because he or she moved across the state
line. While there may at one point have been reasons why the
financing of health care was considered a state or local
responsibility, they no longer exist.
Legislation of this scope should be enacted as a single piece of
legislation (though in fact it may need to be adopted incrementally
for political reasons). Like the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, it would have to amend the Social
Security Act,406 ERISA, and the tax code. The legislation would
probably also have to create a new title to the Social Security Act to
cover the new programs it would include, as well as to repeal or
completely rewrite Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act.
The legislation would be massive, but so was the Medicare
Modernization Act ,° the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,408 the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and any number of
recent budget reconciliation acts. Though Clinton's Health Securityi • 410
Act4"9 was held up to ridicule because of its complexity, it is the
unfortunate fact that in health care complex problems 'require
complex solutions, and that simple solutions are simplistic and
ineffective. 11
The proposed program should be substituted for the current
Medicare program, bringing us in line with most of the rest of the
countries of the world where there is not a special public insurance
program for the elderly. It would, however, be unwise simply to
abolish the Medicare program without providing for its former
beneficiaries. Though poorer Medicare beneficiaries would probably
be better off under the proposed program, some wealthier people
may have to pay more. Medicare, like Social Security, has always
been sold as a social contract, and current beneficiaries and persons
405. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 134, at 106-15 (describing state
attempts to manipulate federal financial participation to maximize Medicaid
revenue).
406. Pub. L. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
407. Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
408. Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
409. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993).
410. See Manish C. Shah & Judith M. Rosenberg, Essay, Health Care
Reform in the 103d Congress: A Congressional Analysis, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
585, 610 (1996).
411. It should also be noted, however, that part of the complexity of the
Clinton health care reform was attributable to the lengths to which it went to
appease all possible political constituencies. Legislation that was more
courageous politically could have been simpler, and left more to subsequent
administrative rulemaking.
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nearing retirement would feel cheated if they thought that they
were losing what they might well have perceived as vested rights
under the program.412 Therefore, all current Medicare beneficiaries,
as well as persons who will become eligible for Medicare over the
next twenty years, would be enrolled in the government acute care
insurance program and would not have to pay premiums that exceed
what they would otherwise have to pay for Part B coverage.
Medicaid, on the other hand, would be wholly replaced by the
program, and few would mourn its passing. Medicaid eligibility
rules have become impossibly complex and irrational, and in many
states Medicaid provider payments are so low that Medicaid's
promise of access for the poor to mainstream medicine is a mockery.
Medicaid has provided for many poor people an essential federal
right to health care and has been a dramatic success story in terms
of its impact on the health of the poor,41" but the proposed program
would afford more solid federal rights, and finally provide the poor
with true equal access to health.care.
Tax subsidies for employment-related insurance would not
survive the reforms. Though employment-related insurance tax
subsidies have been relatively easy to administer, they have
operated capriciously, benefiting the wealthy and offering little to
the poor.4" There will also be less need for tax subsidies for non-
profit health care facilities under the new law, as the facilities will
now be paid when they provide services to the poor, but these
subsidies may still be justified if these facilities continue to sponsor
education and research and offer other community benefits.
Some of the basic provisions of HIPAA could continue in force-
for example, its provisions prohibiting discrimination against
persons covered by group policies415--but others, such as those
416assuring small groups access to health insurance, would no longer
be necessary. HIPAA's prohibition against preexisting conditions
clauses should become universal.41 7 But with universal insurance
coverage, the adverse selection problem that preexisting conditions
clauses address would become moot. COBRA would also no longer
serve a useful purpose, as individuals would have direct access to
insurance without needing coverage under employment-related
plans.
412. See JOST, supra note 34, at 50-51.
413. See Diane Rowland & James R. Tallon, Jr., Medicaid: Lessons from a
Decade, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 138, 139.
414. See Sheils & Haught, supra note 148, at W4-109-10.
415. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(b) (2000).
416. Id. § 300gg-11(a).
417. Id. § 300gg.
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Most of the ad hoc legal infrastructure that has been
constructed at the state level to facilitate access to health care could
be dispensed with under the proposed plan. Basic state regulation
of insurance would need to be continued to assure plan solvency and
honest marketing and claims practices, but state benefit and
provider coverage mandates would be replaced by uniform federal
coverage rules, while state laws intended to expand access would
become superfluous.
The legal requirements of ERISA could also be folded into the
new program. Once again, a comprehensive reform of the health
care system would provide an opportunity to revisit some of the
intractable problems that ERISA has posed. Included among these
is the question of the damages that should be available when a
health plan's negligent denial of coverage results in serious injury to
an insured. Current ERISA jurisprudence denies recovery of
extracontractual damages against a health plan under these
circumstances. 4"8  A couple of Supreme Court Justices, however,
along with distinguished legal scholars, have questioned this
result.419 The new program would significantly reduce the saliency
of this issue, as it would assure coverage for catastrophic health care
costs, make coverage determinations more uniform across plans,
and afford prompt internal and external review where coverage
questions arose.
One body of access-promoting federal and state law that would
not become superfluous in a reformed health care system would be
the civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, gender, or disability.420 The United
States health care system has a long history of racial segregation,42'
and unequal treatment on the basis of race continues to this day.422
Discrimination on the basis of disabling medical conditions, such as
AIDS, also continues.42 3 One would hope that removing financial
barriers to access would improve access to care for minorities and
418. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 212-14 (2004); Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985).
419. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also John H.
Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1365
(2003) (suggesting the Supreme Court has made errors in ERISA remedy law).
420. §§ 2000d, 12182.
421. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A
NATION 3-31 (1999).
422. IOM, UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 361, at 38-79.
423. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998); Howe v. Hull, 874
F. Supp. 779, 782 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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for the disabled. But disparities in health care access are not solely
the result of financial barriers to access, but also of institutional,
organizational, and systemic barriers, as well as of provider
attitudes and behavior.4 4  The civil rights laws should remain in
place to address these issues. To date, enforcement of Title V1425 has
been largely ineffective, but Title VI should at least remain as an
expression of an aspiration, and creative approaches to bring its
values to fruition should be explored.4  EMTALA should also
continue in force. Even though hospitals would be paid for
emergency care under the new program, and would have little
economic reason to deny emergency treatment, they might still
427refuse treatment for discriminatory reasons.
The proposal would have less effect on laws that are currently
in place to address health care cost concerns. Coverage of the civil
and criminal false claims laws4 28 should be extended to include all
public and private insurers in the system, and should be vigorously
enforced in both the private and public sector.4 29  The bribe and
kickback423 and self-referral laws42' should be extended to the private
sector, but they should also be simplified.. Because the acute care
program would continue to operate largely on a fee-for-service basis,
the tendency of bribes and kickbacks to generate unnecessary care
in a fee-for-service environment would continue to be a concern.
Nevertheless, the creation of a new program could provide an
opportunity to review some of the more intrusive applications of the
bribe and kickback and self-referral laws to determine whether they
continue to be needed.
The antitrust laws42 should continue to be enforced so as to
encourage active competition among providers. The remaining state
CON laws, on the other hand, would no longer be necessary once the
federal government took over compensating long-term care facilities
and hospitals, the primary target of state CON programs, as the
424. IOM, UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 361, at 140-59, 162-74.
425. § 200d.
426. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Medicare: What the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services Can, and Should, Do, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. (forthcoming 2006).
427. See, e.g., Howe, 874 F. Supp. at 782 (EMTALA case against hospital
that refused to treat person with AIDS).
428. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000) (civil); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000) (criminal).
429. In an earlier article I have explained why fraud and abuse enforcement
is important for controlling health care utilization and cost. Jost & Davies,
supra note 195, at 239.
430. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1)(A) (2000).
431. Id. §§ 1395nn, 1396b(s).
432. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-12 (2000).
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financial incentives that drive construction of excess capacity could
be limited.
In general, the new program will need to be implemented
through administrative agencies governed by administrative law. In
this sense, it will resemble much of existing health law.433 The
program will, however, like Medicare, involve the private sector
extensively both in management and in administration. It is
important that private sector institutions be used where they bring
flexibility and innovation (or where their use might co-opt opposition
to the law), but that their role be constrained where it could result
in inequity or inefficiency.434  Advisory committees, like the
MEDPAC, should also be used to bring nongovernmental expertise
to the policy-making and rate-setting processes, and to bridge
between Congress and the Executive.435
VII. POLITICAL FEASABILITY: How Do WE GET
THERE FROM HERE?
Now comes the hard part: getting the proposal adopted into law.
It is difficult to interpret the 2004 election as an endorsement of a
national health insurance program. In fact, it is likely that over the
next few years our health care system will continue to deteriorate in
all respects. We are likely to see an expansion of consumer-driven
health plans, as employers, ever more frustrated with their inability
to control health insurance premium increases, try to shift more of
the problem to employees. These plans may well include HSAs,
health reimbursement accounts, or some yet-to-be-designed
mechanism for providing tax subsidies for health benefit plans with
high cost-sharing obligations.4 37 Additional tax credit schemes will
probably make it through Congress, possibly aimed at relatively
low-income uninsureds, like those proposed by President Bush.43 8
.433. See Jost, supra note 9, at 1.
434. For a sample of recent articles addressing the appropriate role of
private institutions in administrative governance, see Jack M. Beermann,
Administrative-Law-Like Obligations of Private(ized) Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1717 (2002); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through
Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role
In Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Symposium, Public Values
in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (2003).
435. See Jost, supra note 133, at 71 (describing the role of MedPAC's
predecessor institutions).
436. See Jon R. Gabel et al., Employers' Contradictory Views About
Consumer-Driven Health Care: Results from a National Survey, HEALTH AFF.-
WEB ExcLusIvE, Apr. 21, 2004, at W4-210, W4-215-17.
437. For a description of the current mechanisms for achieving this, see
FURROW ET AL., supra note 161, at 642.
438. See Press Release, supra note 239.
61320061
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
The amount of these credits will probably be too low to offer much
help to those who are really poor, and they may well aggravate the
situation of the uninsured if they result in even more employers
dropping coverage.439 In a rush to adopt tax credits and to facilitate
consumer-driven health care, Congress is likely to do serious
damage to our employment-based health insurance system, which
has made our lack of a universal public health insurance system
tolerable. As this is happening, however, our public insurance
system is also likely to deteriorate. The President and Congress are
likely to try to block-grant Medicaid, and the states might accept
this if Congress eliminates the right of Medicaid recipients to sue
the states in federal court to enforce their Medicaid entitlement."'
As the states cut back on their increasingly unaffordable Medicaid
benefits, the number of uninsured will continue to increase.
Hospitals may for a time be able to continue to care for the
uninsured through their uncompensated care programs, but this
cannot go on forever. Pressure will mount on Congress to repeal
EMTALA, to which it may at some point succumb.
In the meantime, health care costs will continue to soar, as a
new Medicare drug program comes on line, as billions of dollars are
dumped into the Medicare Advantage program,44' as employers
continue to try to get out of the business of controlling costs, and as
"consumer-driven" health plans result in consumers paying retail
rather than wholesale prices for provider services. Congress may,
after years of political battles, adopt caps on malpractice judgments
and perhaps limits on contingent fees, but this will have no
perceptible effect on limiting health care costs or expanding
access.442 By the next election, we will, in all likelihood, have several
million more Americans uninsured and health care costs that
439. See id.
440. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Secretary Calls for Medicaid Changes,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at A12. The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act passed after
this Essay was completed takes us far in this direction. See KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: IMPLICATIONS
FOR MEDICAID, http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7465.pdf (last visited April 8,
2006).
441. See BRIAN BILES, LAUREN HERSCH NICHOLAS & BARBARA S. COOPER, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: ExTRA PAYMENTS TO
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, 2005 UPDATE 4 (2004), available at http://www.
cmwf.org/usr_doc/750_Biles_costofprivatization_update-ib-pdf.pdf. (Medicare
Advantage is projected to cost the Medicare program in 2005 $2.72 billion more
than the cost Medicare would have incurred had beneficiaries in the MA
program been covered by traditional Medicare).
442. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., ECON. & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: LIMITING TORT
LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
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consume more of the gross domestic product than they do now.44'
When all else fails, we might try the obvious, that is, learning
from the experience of other nations. Of course, that experience is
mixed, but it tends to show that in this one particular corner of the
economy, government often outperforms the private sector. We
could, and should, join the rest of the world in making public health
insurance available to all.
In the meantime several things need to happen. First, a way
must be found to get the media to pay attention to a progressive
voice on health policy. For years, right-wing advocacy centers-the
Heritage Foundation, the Galen Institute, Cato, and others-have
steadily and loudly beat the drum for their market-oriented
solutions to our health care problems.4" The media have been
hearing this drum beat for so long that they have begun to march to
it, either accepting the positions of the right wing as truth or at least
seeing them as valid positions that at most need to be balanced
occasionally with progressive perspectives. The media also often
present negative and misleading caricatures of the health care
systems of other nations."5 Few Americans realize, for example,
that other nations offer quicker access to primary care than does the
141 4474
United States, or have more sophisticated health IT systems.
Progressive voices need to be loud and insistent. They need to get
out accurate information on how health care systems in fact function
in other nations and why market-based solutions are not the answer
to all of our problems.
When the times comes, perhaps in two years, perhaps in six, to
again move forward on health reform, progress may need to be made
incrementally. The Medicare drug bill demonstrates that America
still has a commitment to insuring the elderly, just as the SCHIP
program, established in 1997, showed that we have a commitment to
443. It is projected that by 2008, health care costs will grow to over $2.35
billion dollars and consume 16.4% of the GDP. See Stephen Heffler et al.,
Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Feb.
7, 2003, at W3-54, W3-55. It is difficult to find recent projections on growth in
the number of uninsured, but older sources projected growth to between forty-
eight and sixty-one million people by 2009. WILLIAM S. CUSTER & PAT KETSCHE,
THE CHANGING SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE 18-19 (2000).
444. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 229, at 117-48 (recounting the Heritage
Foundation's campaign to privatize Medicare).
445. This is often seen, for example, in the negative press that the Canadian
health care system gets in the United States. See Theodore R. Marmor et al.,
Fact & Fiction: The Medicare "Crisis" Seen from the United States, in WHITHER
HEALTH CARE POLICY?: U.S., CANADIAN, AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 4-9 (2002).
446. See generally Jost, Dawson & den Exter, supra note 89.
447. See Jost, supra note 33, at 443-48 (Chilean system).
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covering poor children.448 Perhaps catastrophic coverage for all can
come next, or comprehensive coverage for the poor. Alternatively,
there may come a point when so many middle-class Americans (or
their adult children) are uninsured, that the "path dependency" that
has kept us from embracing, national health insurance will lose its
grip.
One barrier that will have to be overcome will be the opposition
of interest groups that profit from the current system -insurers, the
pharmaceutical companies, and organized medicine. It is these
interests that were largely responsible for killing the Clinton plan."9
As the situation of the health care system becomes more dire,
however, these interests may conclude that they have more to gain
than lose by supporting a national health program. Accommodating
these interests within the program, as Medicare did in using
insurers to process claims, might make the reform more palatable to
them. But if interest groups continue to oppose reform, members of
Congress may ultimately have to listen to their constituents rather
than to these obstructionist interest groups.
One of the biggest problems that we will face when the time
comes to adopt a new program will be the problem of cost. The
program proposed in this Essay will certainly require billions of
additional public dollars. How many is difficult to say, though the
catastrophic coverage program proposed here would have covered
the $45.2 billion that the private sector spent on nursing home care
in 2004, and some of the $249.7 billion spent by the private sector on
hospital care in that year.4 50  Senator Kerry's plan for extending
federal catastrophic coverage to employees, giving individuals access
to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, and extending
Medicaid and SCHIP, was priced at $653 billion over ten years.
It is important to understand, however, that government money
spent on the program would not all be new money; indeed most of it
might not be. The government currently spends over $200 billion
dollars a year in tax subsidies for private insurance, and Congress
seems eager to spend more by creating new tax subsidies. The
Medicaid program spends close to $300 billion on caring for the poor,
448. State Coverage Initiatives, Matrix Glossary, State Children's Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP), http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/brochure.pdf
(last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
449. NICHOLAS LAHAM, A LOST CAUSE: BILL CLINTON'S CAMPAIGN FOR
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 208-10 (1996); Jacob S. Hacker & Theda Skocpol,
The New Politics of U.S. Health Policy, in THE NATION'S HEALTH, 186, 189
(Philip R. Lee et al. eds., 6th ed. 2001).
450. Smith et al., supra note 3, at 191 exh.5.
451. Jeanne M. Lambrew, Numbers Matter: A Guide to Cost and Coverage
Estimates in Health Reform Debates, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 446, 447 (2004).
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much of which already goes for nursing home care and the care of
the chronically ill.45 2 The Medicare and Medicaid programs already
.spend billions of dollars to cover the costs of the uninsured through
disproportionate-share hospital payments and medical education
cost subsidies. 453 Bankruptcies shift yet more of the cost of the poor
to uncompensated providers, who try to shift those costs on
ultimately to their patients and insurers.4"4 All of these subsidies
and cost shifting would be eliminated by universal coverage.
A careful study by the Institute of Medicine concluded that
extending coverage to the uninsured would only cost from $34 to $69
billion per year in actual new money, depending on the plan
design.45" This compares favorably to the $99 billion per year cost of
making President Bush's tax cut permanent, mostly for the benefit
of the wealthiest Americans, or to the $137 billion that U.S. health
care costs increased between 2003 and 2004.
Moreover, the cost to government of the new program would not
even all be tax money. Much of the cost of the acute care
government insurance program would be financed by premiums
collected from persons who chose to participate in the program.
Only the subsidies that would cover the premiums for low income
enrollees in the government plan (or in private plans) would be
covered through taxes. And many of these would be persons
currently receiving government funds through Medicaid or SCHIP.
The plan would also result in significant savings. A recent
Institute of Medicine report on the cost of uninsurance in America
concluded that "the aggregate, annualized cost of the diminished
health and shorter life spans of Americans who lack health
insurance is between $65 and $130 billion for each year of health
insurance foregone."'457 The cost control provisions of the proposed
plan should also reduce its cost. A recent study, for example,
estimated that the implementation of fully standardized health care
information exchange and interoperability could save our health
452. In 2004, Medicaid spent $292.7 billion, including $99.1 billion on
hospital care and $64.8 billion on long term care. Smith et al., supra note 3, at
191 exh.5.
453. $16.2 billion in 2001. IOM, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST, supra note 142,
at 54.
454. See Himmelstein, supra note 41, at W5-71.
455. IOM, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST, supra note 142, at 9, tbl. ES.1.
456. See Lambrew, supra note 451, at 450; Smith et al., supra note 3, at 187
exh.1.
457. INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), available at http://darwin.nap.edu/books/030
9 09 1 055
/html/l.html.
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care system $77.8 billion a year.45 It would be much easier to
implement such a system with the rationalization of our health
insurance system that this Essay proposes.
It cannot be denied, however, that the total cost of health care
will continue to rise for the foreseeable future, and under this
proposal, the proportion of the cost of that system borne by
Americans as taxpayers rather than as by private citizens would
grow as well. But this is a cost we can in fact bear. Assuming that
our national productivity continues to increase as it has over much
of the past century, we are essentially looking at devoting to health
care a growing share of an ever-expanding pie. Between 1970 and
2004, the proportion of the GDP spent on health care grew from
7.2% to 16%.49 But over that same period of time, the GDP grew
from $1 trillion to $11.7 trillion in constant dollars.460 Even if the
proportion of GDP we spend on health care keeps growing, and more
of this money is tax money, we will still have on average far more
private money two or three decades from now than we do currently
to spend on the then-equivalent of SUVs, exotic coffees, video games,
or whatever happens to be in fashion at the time, and still be able to
pay for health care.""
The question is ultimately not whether we can afford to provide
health care for all. The question is not even, as I hope this Essay
has demonstrated, whether it is possible to find a way to do this.
The question is, rather, whether we want to do it. If we want to, we
can.
458. Jan Walker et al., The Value of Health Care Information Exchange and
Interoperability, HEALTH AFF.-WEB EXCLUSIVE, Jan. 19, 2005, at W5-10, W5-10,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.10vl.pdf.
459. Smith et al., supra note 3, at 187 exh.l.
460. Id.
461. If we simply project increased worker productivity forward at 1.1% per
year, as compared to historic increases of 1.5% per year over the past fifty
years, per worker productivity will expand from $67,473 in 2000, to $105,982 in
2035 in 2002 dollars. MARLIYN MOON & MATTHEw STOREYGUARD, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., SOLVENCY OR AFFORDABILITY? WAYS TO MEASURE MEDICARE'S FINANCIAL
HEALTH 16, FIGURE 2 (2002), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Solvency-or-
Affordability-Ways-to-Measure-Medicare-s-Financial-Health-Report.pdf. Even
if per American health care costs double during that time in constant dollars,
Americans would still have a great deal of discretionary money left over.
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